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INTRODUCTION
This Article contributes a new transactional alternative to address risks of
catastrophic audit failure: having auditing firms issue bonds to capital markets (called
catastrophe bond securitizations) to provide coverage for these risks. This innovation
follows from the Article’s analysis of longstanding debates about the relative merits of
establishing caps on damages for auditing firms in securities liability cases. In those
debates, a common argument favoring caps is the absence or limited availability of
insurance to address the liability. This forces auditors to resort to self-insurance
programs that they operate through captive affiliates. This Article’s transactional
proposal responds to this insurance-based argument.
On the evidence available, self-insurance appears to be better than external
insurance so that the insurance-based argument does not necessarily support damages
caps. The former bundles risk monitoring and distribution within audit firms whereas the
latter separates the two functions. Even if the argument were valid, moreover, the inquiry
reveals superior alternatives that can be designed to address losses arising from audit
failure. These are (1) financial statement insurance—which has been discussed in the
literature and tailors coverage to risks of ordinary audit failure and (2) catastrophe bond
securitization—which has not been mentioned in the literature and is introduced here as a
way to pool and distribute risks of catastrophic audit failure through capital markets. The
former bundles risk monitoring and distribution within insurers while the latter rebundles them outward to capital markets.
The Article thus tentatively concludes that the insurance-based argument favoring
damages caps warrants analytical skepticism. Analytical skepticism is the most the
conclusion can reach, however, because the evidence available for a definitive
determination is limited. Auditing firms, which are privately owned, provide virtually no
public information necessary to evaluate these issues. Auditing firms do not publicly
disclose any meaningful information about their financial condition or results, disclosing
instead summary data on assets and total worldwide revenues broken down by
geographic region and business line. They provide no disclosure concerning internal or
external insurance models or capacity and only cursory information about internal
organizational structures, controls or governance. In the course of some of the following
analysis, therefore, an inferential picture of practices is developed.
Subject to those limits, after reviewing the terms of debate and introducing basic
principles concerning the role of insurance in public policy governing auditing, the
Article explores two alternative models that exist and two that could be created to address
auditor liability for audit failure. The first of the two existing models is, of course,
traditional professional liability insurance, still commonly obtained by smaller and
medium-sized auditing firms and once commonly used by the four large auditing firms
but now only to a modest, specialized extent. Remarkable about this form of insurance is
how it separates the monitoring by auditors from distribution of the risk of audit failure.
This separation or unbundling of risk monitoring and risk distribution can contribute
comparative disadvantages to the audit function.
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In comparison, the second of the two existing models are more recently-evolved
self-insurance programs. Beginning sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
large auditing firms all developed highly-sophisticated internal structures using captive
insurance affiliates to manage and fund exposure to legal liability for audit failure. While
some participants in the debate view this as evidence of the firms’ dire straits, analysis
supports the view that the decision to self-insure is both rational for the firms and
relatively appealing systemically. Most notably, compared to the unbundling and
separation of functions that external insurance presents, self-insurance programs bundle
the monitoring and risk-distribution functions together within audit firms.
As for two new possible alternatives to address audit failure, the first of these is
financial statement insurance, which has been discussed somewhat in the literature, and is
summarized briefly here. Rather than auditors using professional liability insurance or
self-insuring against the risk of liability from audit failure, this insurance covers
particular financial statements. Issuers buy coverage from external insurers which, in
turn, engage auditors to conduct financial statement audits with the resulting insurance
covering those statements. Like self-insurance, this device bundles monitoring and risk
distribution, although it bundles them into insurers rather than into audit firms. Even so,
in a regime of financial statement insurance, existing commercial insurers as well as
existing audit firm captives could compete to underwrite coverage.
The second novel alternative is insurance-based securitization, which has not been
mentioned in the literature, and is introduced here. Since 1995, financial innovators have
packaged insurance-like products into securities using special purpose entities that pool
and distribute risks through capital markets. Insurance securitizations have concentrated
on risks of catastrophic loss arising from such phenomena as hurricanes and floods. But,
to date, they have not included professional liability insurance of the kind auditors have
obtained externally or developed internally. While this market remains young and thin,
as it matures and deepens, it could be an attractive vehicle to contribute resolution to the
longstanding debate over damages caps for auditors by establishing a vehicle to cover
catastrophic losses.
Intriguing about insurance-based securitization of risks of audit failure is how this
could partially re-bundle the risk-monitoring and risk-distribution functions outward to
capital markets. Investors can essentially invest in functional insurance policies covering
the risk of audit failure. So using capital markets can reduce insurance market volatility
that appears to be at the heart of insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps. It
could add pressure on auditors to promote audit effectiveness and possibly reduce the
incentives that plaintiffs’ lawyers have to pursue excessive damages claims against
auditors of public companies, an important adjunct of such insurance-based arguments.
Best of all, it can precisely address catastrophic audit failure risk which, most seem
agreed, is the most important context in which damages caps warrant serious policy
consideration.
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Part I summarizes the audit function and debates over damages caps. The latter
are often supported by lamenting a lack of insurance, absence of insurability or,
sometimes, an “insurance crisis.” Part II considers existing insurance for audit failure. It
evaluates how audit failure risk may be better addressed by self-insurance than by
traditional liability insurance because of closer bundling of risk monitoring with risk
distribution. Part III explores potential insurance for audit failure. It reviews previous
proposals for financial statement insurance to address ordinary risks of audit failure and
then introduces the novel idea of insurance-based securitization to address catastrophic
risks of audit failure.
I. AUDIT FAILURE: RISK AND CONTROL
The following discussion introduces the parameters and stakes of the audit
function, considers public policy matters implicated and addresses the role of insurance
in policy design. The stakes of audit failure are potentially staggering when only four
large firms are competent to audit the vast majority of public enterprises. This has
revived debates dating back several decades about whether law should set limits on
damages auditors face for audit failure, in which proponents often cite the relative
absence or expense of related insurance.
A. Audit Constituents and Stakes
The audit function addresses multiple constituent classes and, within each class,
many variations of type. The primary constituent is investors (who range from
sophisticated institutions to retail clients investing personal funds). The secondary class
is issuers (which can be of any form, including non-profits and for-profits, private
enterprises or public). Tertiary constituents include other participants in financial
reporting, chiefly an issuer’s officers and directors (especially its audit committee) and
professional advisors (mainly lawyers and underwriters). The latter group also includes
insurers (of issuers, directors and officers and professional service firms, including
auditors) along with regulators (mainly the SEC, but including state and securities and
insurance regulators) and courts (federal and state).
As a group, auditors exhibit some variation in kind. They may usefully be
grouped in three tiers measured by size (either by total revenues or total employees or
professionals, which tend to be commensurate measures). The largest firms generate
annual global revenues approaching $20 billion apiece, employ more than 100,000
people each (a large portion of whom are accounting professionals) and operate in nearly
every country in the world. There are presently four firms in this league (and there have
never been more than eight in recent decades) and they increasingly bear a fairly
homogenous character. A mezzanine tier of medium-sized firms generate a fraction of
those revenues with a fractional employee base (revenues are closer to $1 billion at the
high end of the scale). Thousands of yet smaller firms populate the third tier in the
accounting profession. The four largest firms audit the vast majority of public enterprises
in the world, although mezzanine tier firms audit a meaningful share.
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At stake in any audit for a given issuer is the production of relevant and reliable
financial statements that enable investors to make efficient capital allocation decisions.
At stake for the audit function as a system is social welfare, which is a product of the
relative efficiency of overall capital allocation. Investors buy securities from issuers in
part on the strength of reported accounting. The reports are prepared by management and
attested to by an auditor, under the supervision of an audit committee.
Audit failure means that an auditor issued an opinion that financial statements
fairly present an issuer’s financial condition and results in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) when, it turns out, the opinion was incorrect.
Under federal law, a limited risk of auditor liability for negligence exists in connection
with initial securities offerings, although most federal law actions involve secondary
market trading and require a showing of scienter for private actions.1 On the other hand,
under many state laws, negligence liability risk is considerable when relaxed privity
standards apply instead of the more rigorous traditional privity requirement established in
Judge Cardozo’s classic opinion Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.2 Federal law imposes
further jurisdictional limitations on what kinds of securities-related claims may be
brought in state compared to federal court.3
The magnitude of legal liability that auditors face for audit failure ranges from
routine claims not posing systemic calamity (in the range of $10,000 to $250,000 whose
significance for individual firms varies with firm size) to episodic claims involving
hundreds of millions of dollars that could be systemically catastrophic. The frequency of
1

Principal federal laws are Section 11 under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, and Section 10(b)
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j. The latter applies to secondary trading in
securities and exposes auditors to liability under fraud theories (scienter); the former applies to registered
public offerings of securities and exposes auditors to nominally strict liability, which becomes essentially a
negligence standard because auditors defeat liability by showing reasonable investigation and belief and
also depends on the investor’s ability to prove tracing. Other federal laws include Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §
77(q)(a), and Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which creates private rights of action against
persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading statements in
reports or other documents filed with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78r.

2

255 N.Y. 170 (1931). The privity rule essentially forecloses public shareholder claims against auditors.
Beginning in the 1980s, several state law cases overturned that principle, including Rosenblum v. Adler,
461 A.2d 138 (1983), although a few courts clung to a watered-down version of the privity rule based on a
foreseen plaintiff principle as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. See Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). Auditors also face a remote chance of criminal liability for audit failure that,
if occurring, can have high-magnitude effects. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 917 (2003); United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d
on other grounds, 544 U.S. 1042 (2005). But criminal liability cannot be effectively addressed using either
insurance or caps on damages.
3

See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. Law No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (restricting securities fraud class actions to federal court,
although not covering individual actions or derivative litigation in state court); see Richard W. Painter,
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
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relatively routine exposures is meaningful but not catastrophic: for smaller firms, perhaps
once per year and, for larger firms, perhaps a dozen per year.
For larger cases, debate exists concerning their relative probability, which some
confidently believe is high while others are less certain.4 Federal securities fraud class
actions against auditors are few, but the size of resulting damages or settlements can be
staggering, with four recent settlements reaching into the $200 and $300 million range
and two others also exceeding $100 million.5 At much higher levels, it could be
impossible for an auditing firm to continue in the face of such a payout. Whichever view
in the debate on probability is correct, the magnitude of loss is overwhelming—it could
spell the demise of one of the four large auditing firms which, in turn, could threaten the
industry’s viability.6
B. Public Policy
Policy discussions, which date back decades, consider mechanisms to improve the
audit function and manage systemic effects of audit failure. Analysis considers
promoting year-to-year audit effectiveness, striking the optimal level of deterrence based
on liability standards and, particularly in recent years, preventing cataclysmic audit
failure.
Two kinds of tools can be used to promote the effectiveness of the audit function.
The first concerns structural arrangements designed to induce professional skepticism and
objectivity among auditors. The second concerns liability devices designed to deter
auditors—and their clients—from temptations to mis-report. The liability system is also
designed, in part, to provide compensation to investors who suffer damages from audit
failure caused by violations of law.
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Two models suggest high probability of medium-term, litigation-induced exit of a one of the four large
auditing firms. See Eric H. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big-Four Auditors: An Empirical
Analysis, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2006); LONDON ECONOMICS & RALF EWERT, STUDY ON THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY REGIMES (Sept. 2006) (study examining existing and possible
caps on auditor damages in Europe) [hereinafter, EWERT, EU STUDY].
5

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms,
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 342 (2004) (detailing five settlements through 2004 exceeding $100 million:
settlements of $110 million, $125 million, $217 million, $250 million and $335 million); Talley, supra note
___, at 1670 (noting Fortress Re settlement in 2005 of $250 million). Despite these figures, it is not
uncommon for commentators, or judges, to speak of the potential of “billion dollar judgments” against
auditors. E.g., John Cummings, Top of Mind: Do Accountants Need Liability Protection?,
BUSINESSFINANCEMAG.COM (April 7, 2007) (quoting Deloitte CEO Robert Kueppers as concerned about
“the multibillion-dollar claim” and mentioning figures of $3 billion, $5 billion or $10 billion); Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (expressing concern about the “specter of multi-billion
dollar judgments” against auditors).
6

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the
Industry before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698 (2006) [hereinafter, Cunningham, Too Big to Fail].
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Policymakers and scholars endlessly work to refine these tools in light of
dynamically changing circumstances to achieve the optimal system. Throughout related
debates, arguments for limitations on auditing firm liability tend to change over time as
markets, reforms and laws evolve, but they invariably and steadily appeal to absence or
expense of insurance.
1. Audit Effectiveness — Considerable changes have been made in the past five
years in an effort to promote more effective audits. A leading example is the creation of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as an oversight body to
supervise and regulate the public company auditing industry.7 Specific reforms designed
to improve audit effectiveness include: (1) requiring audit committee supervision of the
audit function; (2) tightening limits on an auditor’s right to provide non-audit services to
audit clients; and (3) providing for audits of internal control over financial reporting.8
Some proponents of capping auditor damages cite these changes to support the
prescription.9
While such reforms likely improve the audit function and reduce risk of audit
failure, their probable success is qualified. Before considering qualifications as to each
of the foregoing reforms, a continuing structural feature constraining audit effectiveness
must be emphasized: issuers still pay their auditors. This creates an inherent conflict of
interest that can impair auditor objectivity and thus reduce audit effectiveness. While
many proposals have been made to eliminate this conflict, none has been adopted in the
United States.10

7

Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter, Paulson Committee Report].

8

This is a partial list of reforms mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act but these are the main reforms. More
modest reforms include federal law mandating audit partner rotation on given engagements every five
years, modest because this was previously an auditing requirement set at seven years. Bolder reform would
require audit firm rotation, but this poses difficult questions that are hotly debated, including as to whether
the familiarity that arises from repeat audits is a benefit that outweighs any gains (such as from
independence, objectivity or competition) from mandatory firm rotation. See U.S. Government Accounting
Office, Public Accounting Firms: Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm
Rotation (Nov. 2003).
9

E.g., Paulson Committee Report, supra note ___, at ___.

10

Alternatives have been proposed to address the payment conflict for auditors as well as for other
intermediaries, including financial statement insurance, public funding, funding through stock exchanges or
voucher financing programs. See, respectively, Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The
Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004) (as discussed
further in Part III, instead of having companies pay auditors, authorizing them to buy insurance and having
insurers hire and pay auditors); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29, n. 180 (suggesting but discounting possibility of having
gatekeepers such as auditors paid through public funding); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to
Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for
Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 76 (having the stock exchanges coordinate
and compensate auditors)); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003).
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As for reforms that have been made, PCAOB faces inherent limitations as a
matter of institutional capability to promote effective auditing. True, PCAOB appears to
be a more pro-active overseer than its predecessors, but that conscientiousness has
created credible political objections to its performance. These objections have led
political leaders and regulatory officials to reconsider many of its efforts.
The striking example concerns PCAOB’s standards governing audits of internal
control over financial reporting. While such audits can increase financial statement
reliability, this is the leading context in which participants have alleged that PCAOB
over-reached.11 Accordingly, not only is PCAOB’s existence a non-compelling argument
for establishing caps, criticism of its handling of internal control audits also neutralizes
the argument favoring caps based on the existence of those audits.
As to audit committee supervision, this may be one of the most important of the
recent reforms.12 For many enterprises, this reform can strongly promote audit
effectiveness. Marking an important shift, recent reforms require that members of audit
committees possess some expertise in financial accounting.13 This is a striking change in
corporate governance discussions, which for several generations have emphasized the
quality of independence rather than expertise.14 There is emerging evidence that having
expertise on the audit committee increases the quality of financial reporting.15 That said,
reliance on this important innovation may be premature.16
11

See SEC Press Release, SEC Commissioners Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation To
Ease Smaller Company Burdens, Focusing Effort On “What Truly Matters,” (April 4, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-62.htm. At its open public meeting on July 25, 2007, the SEC
approved a replacement standard governing audits of internal controls over financial reporting in lieu of the
one that the PCAOB initially adopted.
12

See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1034-36 (2003) (noting importance of empowering audit committees to supervise
auditors, discuss auditor-management disagreements, and retain own professional adviros).

13

See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8220,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 79 SEC Docket 2876
(Apr. 9, 2003); 17 C.F.R. §240.10A-3(b) (2007) (codifying Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)).

14

The trait of director independence emerged as an important value in corporate governance when the
monitoring board replaced the advisory board during the 1970s. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). Ever since, independence rather than expertise has been the clarion attribute of
“good corporate governance.” See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007).
15

Jean Bedard et al., The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive
Earnings Management, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 13 (2004); Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar
Visvanathan, Does the Sox Definition of an Accounting Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit
Committee Director’s Expertise and Conservatism, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884.
16

For example, an emerging debate concerns whether audit committee experts, and others engaged in the
financial reporting process, should promote a financial statement orientation towards equity investors or
debt investors. At stake is the degree to which historical cost or fair value accounting should be preferred.
8

Limiting non-audit services may promote audit effectiveness, although evidence
is mixed,17 and in any event creates other concerns. At present, some issuers of public
securities face limited or no choice of auditors and, if only three large audit firms were to
exist, many would have no choice. This restricted choice, which exists in part because of
the small number of capable firms, is amplified by both legal limits on non-audit services
firms can supply to clients and the auditing industry’s practice of firm specialization in
certain industries. To the extent that only such a small coterie of firms are capable of
auditing the vast majority of public enterprises, a risk arises that firm partners and
employees may consider their firms “too big to fail,” which could impair rather than
promote effective auditing.18 Damages caps could have a similar unintended side-effect.
2. Deterrence — The second category of tools available to promote effective
auditing concentrate on deterrence, both as to auditors and their clients. Deterrence
strategies pursue designing the optimal type and scope of legal duties and liabilities that
auditors and others have. As with structural tools, policymakers and scholars regularly
reevaluate system design and law periodically changes in response to debates. Issues
include the standard of liability (from negligence to scienter),19 the scope of exposure
(from primary to aiding-and-abetting),20 and adjective devices (such as statutes of
limitation,21 pleading standards22 or jurisdictional limitations23).
This hinges, in turn, on issues such as whether value relevance (usefulness) or efficient debt contracting are
important components of the demand for accounting reports. See, e.g., Ray Ball, Ashok Robin & Gil
Sadka, Is Accounting Conservatism Due to Debt or Share Markets? A Test of “Contracting” Versus
“Value Relevance” Theories of Accounting (Feb. 27, 2005); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Independence, Expertise and Accounting (draft manuscript August 2007).
17

E.g., William R. Kinney, Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor Independence, Non-Audit
Services and Restatements: Was the US Government Right?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 561 (2004); see also Jayanthi
Krishnan, Heibatollah Sami & Yinqi Zhang, Does the Provision of Nonaudit Services Affect Investor
Perceptions of Auditor Independence?, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 111 (2005) (noting mixed results
of empirical research on the effect of non-auditing services on auditor independence and investigating
whether investors perceive such an effect—and interpreting the results affirmatively).

18

See Cunningham, Too Big to Fail, supra note ___.

19

Compare Ultramares; supra note ___; with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(restricting Section 10b actions to scienter, not negligence).

20

See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (Section 10b does
not expose auditors (or other professionals) in private litigation to liability for adding and abetting
securities fraud); Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between
Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort,
Words on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865
(1995).

21

For Section 10(b) actions, the current statute of limitations period is two-years-from-constructive
knowledge, subject to a maximum five-year period of repose. 15 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (negating Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which provided a one-year-from-constructiveknowledge limitations period, subject to a three-year period of repose, in turn altering the traditional
judicial approach of borrowing relevant limitations period from analogous common law fraud context).
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Detailed exploration of this terrain is unnecessary to conduct this Article’s
principal inquiry, except to note that optimality means sufficient deterrence at reasonable
cost. Sub-optimality can arise from a liability regime in which potential damages are so
high that they induce over-auditing or so high that imposing them on a firm could lead to
its dissolution and the auditing industry to unravel. It is possible to address these
problems by creating limitations on damages. Various types of limitations are possible,
including safe harbors, proportionate liability and stated damages caps (which, in turn,
can assume many forms).24
As to safe harbors, they can fairly and usefully be justified for certain auditing
practices. An example concerns audits of internal control over financial reporting to the
extent that auditors make forward-looking statements in their related reports on the
relative effectiveness of those controls.25 These have not been adopted and this Article
does not address them directly. It does contribute insights, however, concerning any
arguments supporting safe harbors that are based on the absence or limited availability of
external insurance.
As to proportionate liability, in 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) eliminated joint-and-several liability for negligence, replacing it with
liability in proportion to fault.26 This is, in substance and effect, a functional damages
cap.27 Proportionate liability caps auditor liability at the level of culpability so that
auditors are not exposed to all losses from financial calamity arising after an audit failure
occurs. A theoretical defense of this limitation was made in 1984 by Professor Ebke.28
22

See [Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___ (2007)]; Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300
(2d Cir. 2000) (interpreting pleading standards that Congress enacted in 1995 to endorse pre-existing
Second Circuit approach requiring that pleadings demonstrate “strong inference” of scienter); see also In re
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
23

See SLUSA, supra note ___.

24

An additional functional cap arises when firms opt to use the limited liability partnership form of
business organization, which all four large auditing firms have adopted since this became possible in the
early 1990s. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 427, 447 (2004).
25

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure,
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1451 (2004).

26

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.

27

See EWERT, EU STUDY, supra note ___, at ___.

28

Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the
Independent Auditors’ Responsibilities, 79 NW. L. REV. 663 (1984) (inspired by and studying negligent
accountant cases altering Ultrameres, preceding Bily). Professor Ebke also mentioned, in passing, another
option for risk distribution by creating a federal insurance fund akin to FDIC.
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The analysis emphasizes the need for a link between the extent of auditors’ fault and
resulting liability.29
As to stated damages caps, these have been debated since at least the 1970s.30
Three varieties can be identified: fixed dollar, variable dollar and fixed percentage. They
can be implemented by legislation, regulation or contract. A primary criticism of any
variety of caps, of course, is that they reduce the deterrent effect of the liability threat.
But that criticism misses the point, which is to design the system to achieve optimal
deterrence, not maximal deterrence.31 A cap could contribute to the optimum.32
Professor Ebke also evaluated fixed dollar caps in 1984. He noted that the main
benefit to fixed caps is to improve risk analysis, by either the auditing firms or their
insurers. Optimal design would assure that auditor exposure is not out of proportion to
auditor gain. Yet to be effective for risk analysis, the amounts would have to be
relatively low. But this means, in turn, that fixed caps per case would be both unfair and

29

Professor Ebke also recommended that state courts adapt federal law’s scienter standard into analysis of
non-privity cases. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note ___, at 695. He suggested that if scienter
can be shown then liability could expand to parties not in privity with the auditor but to require privity in
all other cases (including negligence cases). Doing so is appealing because the scienter standard keeps
auditor liability within reasonable bounds while extending it to all foreseeable third parties; since insurance
generally excludes coverage for scienter, liability’s deterrent effect remains.
30

See, e.g., Ted J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants’ Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 31 (1975) (proposing damages caps measured in terms of revenue for given client or total revenue).
For a sampling of the literature across the decades, see Constantine N. Katsoris, Accountants’ Third Party
Liability: How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1968); Michael A. Mess, Accountants and The
Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 N.D. L. REV. 838 (1977); David L. Menzel, The Defense of
Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 292 (1983);
Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983).
31

Damages caps are not an uncommon component of a liability system’s design. Early examples appeared
in maritime law. See Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 181 (maritime law designed to
encourage investment in ship-building by capping owners’ liability at vessel’s net value). Other examples
appear in the ALI’s Federal Securities Code, insider trading class actions, some state corporate laws, as
well as those sought by auditors for decades. See, e.g., The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities:
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 154 (1978) (commission established by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants known as the Cohen Commission); R. JAMES GORMLEY, THE LAW OF
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 17-11 (1981).
32

An additional challenge is federalism within the US and global coordination worldwide. Within the US,
any effective cap would require federal legislation that preempts contrary state laws. Furthermore, given
that the four large firms are global in scale, an additional challenge is assuring worldwide adoption of caps.
This exercise is ongoing. For example, both the UK Parliament and the European Union (EU) are flirting
with the notion. Notably, however, when first proposed, the Statute for European Companies and the Fifth
Company Law Directive of the European Community did not provide statutory limitations on auditor
damages. See Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note ___, at 696 n. 172. The EU’s pending project on
the Eighth Company Law Directive has commissioned a study of the subject. See EWERT, EU STUDY,
supra note ___, at ___.
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ineffective. When the limit is too low, they would lead to nominal recoveries, but even
low limits that provided fair recoveries could still pose a catastrophic risk for auditors.
If the main concern is the catastrophic case, then the cap would be some fairly
large number today, in the range of $450 million to $2 billion (for smaller firms, perhaps
$30 to $100 million).33 That could help with cutting out the mega-claim, but does not
meet Professor Ebke’s objection about being sufficiently low to enable superior risk
analysis. Risks below that level are just as analytically tractable or intractable as without
any cap.
Professor Fiflis’s 1975 proposal offered a variable dollar cap proposal. It would
cap damages either (a) for a given client’s audit, at a multiple of fees received from that
client during a stated period or (b) for all clients, at a multiple of revenues from all clients
for a period. Criticism of Professor Fiflis’s proposal observed how investors in
companies audited by smaller auditors stand to recover less than investors in companies
audited by larger ones. That would increase audit industry concentration as enterprises
would tend to appoint larger firms. That hurts smaller firms, increases prices, could
reduce audit quality, and, if demand is relatively inelastic, hurts investors. This critique
is particularly apt today, when encouraging additional rivals to the dominant four firms
is, for many, an important policy objective.34
The debate continues today. Professor Partnoy offers a fixed percentage approach
to establishing caps on auditor liability for audit failure.35 He envisions statutory
authorization to permit auditors and their clients to contract for allocation of damages
from audit failure according to a stated split. A question about the fixed percentage
approach is whether it nevertheless could bankrupt an auditor. Even a small percentage of
a large judgment could produce auditor insolvency. As a result, Professor Coffee prefers
the approach offered earlier by Professor Fiflis.36 Another concern of the fixedpercentage approach is how publicity of such arrangements could also hurt smaller firms,
which are less able to commit to high allocations, and thus poses the same adverse effects
as multiples-based caps.
Related pending debates consider the extent to which auditors and clients should
be permitted, in engagement letters, to control liability contractually. Examples apart
from the fixed-percentage proposal are contracts that require alternative dispute
33

See Talley, supra note ___, at 1679 (estimating viability thresholds of large auditing firms in terms of
what level of damages they could support before likely electing to dissolve, with estimates from $454
million to $2.15 billion).
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See US GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND
COMPETITION, STUDY ON AUDIT INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION (July 2003).
35

See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365
(2004).

36

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note ___.
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resolution (rather than jury trials) or expressly exclude punitive damages (although this
exclusion already exists under federal securities law and under many state laws).37
Debate also addresses the optimal vehicle to establish any caps. Examples of alternatives
means of implementing a cap are by regulatory formula (as in the proposals by Professor
Fiflis and Professor Coffee), contractual negotiation (as in Professor Partnoy’s proposal)
or by insurance-driven measurements (a proposal that Professor Ronen has made that I
have endorsed).38
3. The Insurance Argument — All the various proposals mentioned above, the
relative merits of which are beyond this Article’s focus, share a common argument
supporting them in principle: the relative expense or limited availability of insurance.39
While the insurance-based argument is ultimately that simple, based on insurance
expense and limits, more complex variations of the argument appear. The first is the
more subtle claim that the cause of expensive or limited insurance is legal uncertainty
and/or unpredictably expanding legal liability. Professor Ebke’s 1984 analysis, for
example, expressed concern that “increased civil litigation” against auditors increases
insurance premiums or restricts its availability “at any price.”40
The second is the more dramatic claim that rivets concern not on the quotidian
case but on the catastrophic case from that unpredictable expansion: staggering liability
threatening auditing firm insolvency with systemic ripple-effects that could demolish the
entire auditing industry. In the late 2000s, for example proponents of establishing
damages caps for auditors arising from audit failure contend that caps below catastrophic
levels “would allow insurers to re-enter this market. Insurance would . . . . allow audit
firms to price risk and create a source of recovery for shareholders.”41
While these more subtle and dramatic claims are worth separate attention, they
ultimately do not make much of a difference to the basic argument from relative expense
or limited availability of insurance. After all, legal uncertainty is endemic and pervasive
so it cannot be eliminated for auditing and is not unique to it. And auditor-friendly
37

See Council of Institutional Investors, Roundtable Discussion on Auditor Agreements: Discussion
Summary (Nov 10, 2005), www.cii.org; Interagency Report on Auditor Engagement Letters
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2006/SR0604a1.pdf (opposing such provisions).
38

See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.
L. BUS. 39, 48-60 (2002) (issuers obtain insurance at pre-determined levels to cover their financial
statements with benefits that include increased investor monitoring of financial statement reliability); see
infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
39

While the merits are beyond this Article’s scope, worth noting about proposing all auditor liability
matters to be established by contract rather than tort law are two important facts: (1) the considerable
agency costs embedded in the existing corporate governance structure which limits the probability that
managers interact with auditors in favor of investor interests and (2) the oligopoly of the auditing industry
that restricts issuer choice and reduces audit firm incentives to compete on service or product variation.
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See Ebke, supra note ___, at 690.
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Paulson Committee Report, supra note ___, at ___
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reform efforts are not directed so much to promoting legal certainty but to limiting legal
liability. That is the essence of a cap, for instance, which does not so much increase legal
certainty as simply put an upper financial limit on legal judgments.
Indeed, legal certainty and predictability could be provided by a law such as
always making auditors strictly liable in the amount of $200 million for every audit
failure. Yet despite the certainty and predictability of such a law, insurance could remain
expensive and limited. This is due, in part, to how uncertainty is a prerequisite to the
effectiveness of insurance—as explained in the next section, events that are certain to
occur do not benefit from the risk distribution function that insurance can provide.
True, unpredictability can impair insurance effectiveness and present catastrophic
risk that insurance cannot cover. However, analysis and empirical evidence indicates that
expensive or limited insurance is not due solely to unpredictably expanding liability and
accompanying catastrophic risk but also to traditional insurance limitations arising from
moral hazard, adverse selection and the rarity of catastrophic cases.42 As explored in
Parts II and III of this Article, while these matters pose difficulties for existing and
potential insurance to address quotidian and catastrophic risk from audit failure, they also
reduce the insurance-based argument to the basic claim of expense or limited availability
of insurance rather than implicate the more subtle or dramatic theories about legal
uncertainty or unpredictably expanding liability.
However conceived, the insurance-based argument resonates forcibly during
periods when insurance markets contract. Insurance markets expand and contract
cyclically through periods designated as either “hard” or “soft” markets, in cycles that
approximate seven years.43 As a thumb-nail sketch of such cyclicality, the market for
professional liability insurance for auditors hardened considerably from the late 1970s
through the early and mid-1980s, in partial response to increasing risk of negligence
liability for audit failure;44 the market then softened in the late 1980s;45 it hardened again
42

See Peter Moizer & Lisa Hansford-Smith, UK Auditor Liability: An Insurable Risk?, 2 INT’L J. AUDITING
197 (1999); see infra text accompanying notes ___-___ and ___-___.
43

See FRANK CRYSTAL & CO., INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW 5 (Winter/Spring 2006) (“A hard market is
one in which insurance rates increase (net written premiums increase substantially) and coverage tends to
be relatively restricted. A soft market is one in which rate reductions are common (net written premium
increases only nominally) and broad coverage terms are readily available. The cycle from hard market, to
soft market and back to hard market occurs regularly at a peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough interval of
approximately seven years.”).
44

See John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Institutional Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1929, at n. 111 (1988) (evidence from (x) the late 1970s of a “sharp premium rise and exit of some firms
from insurance market,” citing H. JAENICKE, THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION ON INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 4 (2d
ed. 1981); (y) the early 1980s of loss claims that “resulted in insurance becoming unavailable or
prohibitively expensive,” citing Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, J. ACCT. 52 (July
1986); and (z) the mid-1980s that number of E&O insurers to small and mezzanine firms shrunk from 12 to
3).
45

See Practising Law Institute (Accountants’ Liability 1989: The Year in Review), Developments in
Liability Insurance, 653 PLI/CORP. 9 (July 1, 1989) (noting market softening with insurers writing policies
14

in the early 1990s in response to the dissolution of the firm of Laventhol & Horwath;46
the market remained hard for a few years—and this appeared to be global rather than USspecific;47 then it softened again in the late 1990s in partial response to the PSLRA and
has hardened yet again since the early and mid-2000s amid both accounting scandals and
resulting regulatory reform.48 The professional liability insurance market for auditors
should soften further to the extent that such reforms increase audit effectiveness and
reduce liability risk from audit failure. At present, the market remains hard.49
This cyclicality—which is explored at more micro levels in the next Part—
presents a preliminary implication. Proposals to cap liability that are supported by
arguments about a lack of insurance may be unable to respond to the dynamics of those
markets. A legal mechanism would have to be in place to suspend and reinstate caps as
insurance markets fluctuate. Given competing demands on lawmakers and the difficulty
for small and medium-sized firms with larger limits of liability and inducing the insurer Crum & Forster,
under an AICPA sponsored program, to increase limits to $5 million from $1 million and entry of Home
Insurance Co. and Orion Insurance Co. but still noting difficulty of large firms obtaining high limit
coverage and facing large deductibles so that insurance covered only catastrophic loss levels—meaning
large firms must “in essence” self-insure smaller claims).
46

See Robert A. Prentice, Can the Contributory Negligence Defense Contribute to a Defusing of the
Accountant’s Liability Crisis?, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 359, 360-61 (1995) (high level of unresolved claims plus
legal costs and demise of Laventhol & Horwath “made it nearly impossible for the [large auditing] firms to
find insurance, and has caused approximately forty percent of smaller firms to go without insurance
altogether”); id. at n. 13 (citing Michael Schachner, Big Six Losses Don’t Add up to Cover Crisis for Small
Firms, BUS. INS., Nov. 22, 1993, at 3 (suggesting that “capacity has all but evaporated for Big Six firms,
causing several to entirely self-insure”); id. (“Those who do buy insurance are paying much more than
previously. Auditors, for example, are paying three times the premium with six times the deductible as
compared to 1985. Some firms are paying premiums of $150,000 per year—more than is paid by most
surgeons—for the reduced coverage”) (citations omitted).
47

See Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of Law and Accounting: An
Examination of a Trend Toward A Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the
Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 220-21 (2000) (“auditors have been unable to spread or
socialize risk through the purchase of professional liability insurance. The unavailability of liability
insurance may also reduce the quality of corporate financial reporting.”); id. at n. 384 (“In the United
States, large accounting firms are now able to buy only a portion of the coverage they could buy prior to
1985 and only for much higher premiums. Virtually all mid-size firms tend to be highly underinsured.
Liability insurance for small firms is expensive with almost 50% not carrying any insurance at all”); id. at
n. 384 (“In the United Kingdom, below $75 million the Big Five retain the risks themselves as selfinsurance using their own captive insurance companies. The effective ceiling on coverage is $340 million”
(citing Peter Mozier & Lisa Hansford-Smith, UK Auditor Liability: An Insurable Risk, 2 INT’L J. AUDITING
197, 204 (1998)); id. (“In Canada and Australia, the scale of the problem is such that auditors are finding it
increasingly difficult to obtain insurance and that where it is available it is extremely expensive.”).
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See Dan L. Goldwasser, M. Thomas Arnold & John H. Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability, Ch. 11:
Professional Liability Insurance, PLI, § 11.2 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter Goldwasser, Arnold &. Eickemeyer,
Accountants’ Liability (2006)] (“Although the market for professional liability insurance softened in the
late 1990s, it has become tighter in the wake of the accounting scandals in 2001-2002 and the subsequent
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of fashioning legislation that includes sufficient prospective flexibility, a legislative
solution to the challenge is not likely to work. The observation does point in a more
promising direction. It could be desirable to develop mechanisms that reduce insurance
market volatility, if not strategies that would expand and sustain availability for all
time.50
The insurance-based argument for caps raises numerous issues, including the
following. Are insurers really not willing to provide this insurance? Is there really no or
little insurance available? How does the existence of large firm self-insurance programs
affect the analysis? Are damages caps really necessary to support the efficacy of the
audit function? If rejuvenating insurance is appealing, are there alternatives that would
enable doing so? For example, could insurance cover financial statements rather than
auditors? This could contribute a mechanism other than fiat to establish caps, assuming
caps were desirable, and thus at least address risks of ordinary audit failure. Finally,
could audit failure risk be distributed more widely by securitizing this risk through capital
markets? Could insurance-based securitization reduce the volatility of professional
liability insurance markets? Could it at least be used to address the specific concerns
associated with catastrophic audit failure risk?
C. The Role of Insurance
Before pursuing such questions in the next two Parts, some initial perspective on
the role of insurance in system design is in order. It may seem backwards to design the
parameters of a liability system in relation to the capacity of insurance coverage to meet
it. The system should set liability to achieve optimal deterrence (or, perhaps,
compensation). But determining such an optimum requires examining all system
components, including out-of-pocket costs imposed on targeted actors, the share of losses
to be absorbed by insurance (or indemnification or other devices), the consequence of
insurance losses as translated into future premiums and so on. In this calculus, it is
reasonable to evaluate the role and capacity of insurance in overall system design.
1. Optimality — Allowing that insurance capacity should inform system design
does not mean that its availability should be the basis for enlarging liability levels by
assuming its continued availability nor should its lack of availability be the basis for the
opposite. Insurance and similar resources cannot be assumed to exist or not to exist.
Insurance affordable today may not be affordable tomorrow and vice versa.51
Accordingly, the investigation that follows is not intended to reach conclusions
concerning the exact design of the liability system or the precise role insurance
50

See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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See, e.g., Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Institutional Tort Reform, supra note ___, at
1948-49 (criticizing “the standard bromide of modern tort law: the use of insurance to offset tort liability”
and then citing and discussing Rosenblum, supra, which “concluded that because accountants have been
able to obtain malpractice insurance against claims made directly by their clients, there was ‘no reason to
believe’ they could not similarly insure against third-party claims” and noting how this belief is
“dangerously misguided”).
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availability or unavailability should play in that design. Rather, it is intended to identify
and estimate the scope of available insurance and how to expand its availability so that
the maximum level of potential resources can be identified and that knowledge can then
be used to inform system design.52
Nor is this to conclude that maximizing the aggregate available insurance is
necessarily ideal. Perversely, expanding insurance capacity can actually reduce
recoveries available to injured parties and this can frustrate any compensatory objectives
that a liability system may be intended to achieve.53 While this peculiarity more nearly
raises questions about the function of compensation in the liability system compared to
deterrence, the two goals continue to play at least some role in policy design. Still,
evaluating claims of lack of insurance and promoting optimal system design (including as
to damages caps) can be improved by an appreciation of the range and type of insurance
products that can be fashioned to address risks.
2. Statistical Independence — Risks are susceptible to the risk management
functions of insurance if they are statistically independent of one another. The risk of
audit failure leading to legal liability generally satisfies this condition. It cannot be
predicted with certainty and it is not necessarily random. Auditors can make reliable
predictions and can even influence outcomes. But fraud can be hidden, illegal acts
obscured, measurements imprecise, papers lost and rogue managers evasive. Audit
failures occur through ordinary carelessness, actual negligence, gross negligence, and
sometimes scienter. Some audits are failures but are never uncovered as such.54
If these matters could be controlled, then prediction would be perfect. At the
extreme, if two events both are certain to occur, insuring them does not contribute to risk
pooling or distribution; even if two events are not certain to occur but likely to occur in
exactly the same circumstances, insurance cannot contribute to risk distribution. But if
the risks have probabilities of occurring and those probabilities arise from different
circumstances, then insurance is useful to pool and distribute both risks. As there is
invariably some non-random chance of audit failure (as there is with death, earthquakes,
52

See George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV.
999 (1989) (“few would dispute that a central ambition of a civilized society is to maximize the availability
of insurance against all forms of prospective loss” and “I believe this conclusion is the heart of the most
influential philosophical justification for the modern state” (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971)).
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See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1553 n.74 (2006); compare Roberta Romano, What Went
Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1989) (“The availability
of insurance need not lead to an increased level of misconduct: in a competitive insurance market, even if
insurers cannot monitor insureds perfectly, they can adjust insurance contract terms and offer partial
insurance to mitigate the moral hazard of insurance inducing suboptimal levels of care by insureds” (citing
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982)).
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Bishop Berkeley might have asked, as with trees falling in unpopulated forests, whether an uncovered
audit failure is really an audit failure.
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floods and clouds on title), the condition is generally met: the risk of any given audit
failure is statistically independent of the risk of any other and non-correlated.55
3. Limiting Probability — Two broad categories of strategies can be deployed to
address risk by managing its two components: limiting the probability of occurrence and
limiting magnitude if it does occur. As to limiting probability, common examples outside
auditing are driving carefully, using fire-resistant materials in buildings, installing safety
devices on machines and engineering beach-erosion protection.
For auditing, steps to reduce the probability of legal liability from audit failure
include the reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act discussed earlier: installation of PCAOB
as an oversight body for the industry; vesting audit committees with direct supervisory
power over individual auditors; limiting the scope of non-audit services; and providing
testing of and opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls. Additional devices
include increased probing, strategic detection tools, investing in training of personnel,
and having multiple teams of professionals review the performance of the engagement (as
when a firm dispatches an engagement team but provides oversight by the national
office).
4. Limiting Magnitude — As to limiting magnitude, steps are addressed to
reducing the effects of a loss once it occurs. Non-audit examples are using air bags and
seat belts when driving, installing sprinkler systems in buildings and providing first-aid
kits on shop floors. For auditing, steps include prompt disclosure of corrections, swift
preparation of financial restatements, continuous disclosure and, especially to address
collateral effects, delisting of issued securities when they are accompanied by materially
misleading financial statements. It also includes developing reserve funds available to
meet such losses without disrupting an ongoing enterprise.
Investors may exert themselves to reduce the magnitude of audit failure. A key
device available to them is diversification.56 Under modern portfolio theory, investors
can reduce the risk of a single stock price drop by owning opposite-behaving stocks or a
group of differently-behaving stocks. The result is that peculiar risks associated with
given securities are reduced (for the price of also reducing the “risk,” or positive chance,
of a single stock price surge). This theory is designed to address business volatility rather
than effects precipitated by financial misstatements, but the strategy nevertheless can
reduce the latter’s effects.

55

“Generally” because there is some reason to believe that certain kinds of audit failures—or audit failure
risks—congregate in particular industries or proliferate during certain economic environments. See David
B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss? Controlling Auditor Incentives through Random Selection, 53
EMORY L. J. 391, 428 (2004).
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18

5. Distributing Residual Risk — Some risk remains even after taking prudent
steps to reduce probability and magnitude. The traditional way to distribute residual risk
is by transferring it to another party using an insurance contract. Risk-averse persons are
willing to pay a relatively small but steady amount to avoid shouldering the risk of a
possible one-time but staggering payout. Insurance enables doing so.
At the limit, insureds can completely eliminate their risk for a price (premium):
they opt for a certain small loss instead of an uncertain large loss (and if renewed
annually, a certain stream of small losses in exchange for eliminating an uncertain large
loss). Insurers profit by pooling these individual risk-aversion payments to generate a
resource base that exceeds the aggregate amount of probable losses.57 This pooling
function thus not only transfers risk, it also distributes risk across all insureds in the
pool.58
While risk-aversion is generally assumed to obtain across a wide range of persons
for whom insurance appeals as a risk distribution mechanism, risk aversion can vary with
absolute and relative stakes. The standard example of risk aversion illustrates. It
imagines a person facing a choice between a certain loss of $500 and a 50% chance of
losing $1,000 (meaning an expected loss of $500). People who are risk averse choose the
certain loss as they are averse to the risk of doubling it (while risk preferring people take
that chance and risk neutral people are indifferent).
To see how risk aversion can vary with absolute stakes, imagine how increasing
the stakes affects the distribution of persons who are risk averse (or risk neutral or risk
preferring). The population of persons who are risk averse tends to increase as the stakes
rise: given a choice between a certain loss of $1 and a 50% chance of losing $10,000
(meaning an expected loss of $5,000), very few offered the choice would roll the dice.
To see how risk aversion can vary with relative stakes, consider how a decisionmaker’s background position affects choices made in the foregoing examples. Suppose
that persons in the first example command, respectively, a net worth of $1,000 and of $1
million. In that fact pattern, the former person will be more risk averse to the uncertainty
of a $1,000 loss (for that person, such a loss wipes out net worth) compared to the
millionaire (for whom such a loss is a drop in the net worth bucket). A potential
insured’s relative wealth can thus be an important driver of relative risk aversion.
Even so, the more risk averse one is, the more one is willing to pay to avoid risk.
Avoidance strategies include paying a third party insurer to assume risk. To modify the
preceding examples, suppose that 100 risk-averse people each face a 1% chance of losing
$1,000 (each faces an expected loss of $10). But also suppose that they have the choice,
57
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using insurance, to part with a certain $15 instead of facing that chance. A third party
might be willing to accept the $15 from each of those 100 people, grossing $1,500, in
exchange for accepting the risk of having to pay $1,000. If so, the result is an insurance
market with 100 insureds paying the insurer to take each of their risks.
II. EXISTING INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE
Auditors (and investors) typically handle risk of legal liability in much the same
way that others address kindred risks: monitoring risk to control it (limiting probability
and magnitude) and using insurance to distribute the residual. This Part discusses two
classes of tactics that auditors long have used to deal with the residual risk by distributing
it: third-party insurance and self-insurance. It tentatively concludes that self-insurance is
comparatively superior to E&O insurance in promoting audit effectiveness.
A. Errors and Omissions (E&O) Insurance
Auditors have long used insurance to transfer and distribute risk of legal liability
arising from audit failure. The insurance is variously dubbed professional liability
insurance, malpractice insurance or, most broadly, errors & omissions (E&O) insurance.
Two general limitations accompany such insurance—moral hazard and adverse
selection—plus several limitations that raise issues of peculiar significance to the audit
function concerning monitoring.
1. Moral Hazard — As to moral hazard, insureds who completely eliminate their
risk for a price have lesser incentive to limit probability or magnitude than those who do
not. The result is that insurance can perversely increase both. A theoretically appealing
response to this problem is for insurers to monitor insureds and adjust premiums
according to steps that each insured takes to minimize probability and magnitude.
Ideally, premiums are then matched precisely to risks. Alas, when pooling risks,
monitoring each insured is costly and sometimes impossible. A second-best strategy
emerges of incomplete risk elimination—that is, having the insured retain some risk.
Risk retention devices in insurance include deductibles, coinsurance and self-insured
retentions.59
To appreciate how retentions function, first note that E&O insurance is written
with limits-of-liability, meaning an express contractual limitation on the insurer’s
responsibility to pay under a policy. Traditional policies use a single amount to establish
both coverage per claim as well as aggregate limits (that is, the aggregate policy amount
is available to cover any one claim). This is satisfactory for most small and mediumsized auditing firms which, on average, face one claim per year for every 100
professionals employed.60 Larger firms face more frequent annual claims and related
59
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policies accordingly separately state limits per claim on the one hand and aggregate limits
on the other.61
Virtually all E&O policies (with the exception of some for small firms) use
deductibles or self-insured retentions. Deductibles require insureds to cover losses up to
a stated amount before the insurer is obligated to contribute; self-insured retentions
require insureds to cover losses before the insurer is obligated to pay the full amount of
the limits-of-liability.62 Deductibles, which are less favorable to insureds, are more
common in traditional E&O insurance (for smaller firms) while larger firms tend to
obtain policies using the more favorable self-insured retention terms.63
In the audit function, moral hazard can cut multiple ways. For example,
expansive liability presents moral hazard to shareholders ex ante. If shareholders know
they will be able to successfully sue an issuer’s auditor to recover losses due to audit
failure, they enter the picture with fewer incentives to self-protect.64 This is a theoretical
defense not only of the privity rule for auditor negligence as in Ultrameres, but also to
support a case for limiting liability in others way, either doctrinally (as through tort law’s
economic loss doctrine) or by fiat using damages caps. With such public policies in
place, investors have increased incentives both to monitor issuers (and their auditors) and
to effectively self-insure through investment portfolio diversification.
On the other hand, such doctrinal or fiat limitations pose a different problem of
moral hazard, increasing moral hazard among auditors on an engagement who are aware
that their loss exposure is capped. One issue is whose behavior is more likely to be
influenced by such moral hazard. This hinges, in large part, on the strength of other
incentives that shareholders face to self-protect on the one hand and auditors have to
avoid conduct leading to audit failure on the other. My purpose is not to settle that issue,
but to observe how that variable in the audit function contributes a kind of uniqueness
compared to other tort liability and insurance contexts.65
61

Id.
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To illustrate the difference, consider a policy with an aggregate limits-of-liability of $2 million applicable
to audit failure damages of $2.5 million. With a deductible of, say $100,000, the insured must cover the
first $100,000 and the insurer the remaining $1.9 million of policy coverage (leaving a $500,000 uninsured
shortfall and a total obligation of $600,000); with a retention of, say also $100,000, the insured must cover
$100,000 of the total loss, meaning the insurer pays the full $2 million limits-of-liability and the insured the
rest, for a total of $500,000. Id.
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Id.
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See Siliciano, Negligent Accounting, supra note ___, at 1948.
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The auditing context is not sui generis, of course, as tow examples suggest. First, it is possible to
conceive of the problem of auditor liability as a problem of legal error risk arising from juries or judges
awarding excessive damages. But this problem pervades the US liability system and is certainly not unique
to auditing. Absent a comprehensive systemic solution, context-specific solutions should be sought.
Second, one might observe that purchasers of securities discount the purchase price to reflect the
probability of financial catastrophe from audit failure (among other risks). Yet this does not distinguish the
securities investor class from many others, including, for example, owners of properties in areas prone to
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An additional complication concerns auditors’ capacity to pass insurance-related
costs through to clients. Shifting financial risks from auditors to insurers would not
diminish deterrence so long as auditors as a group suffered when one auditor failed. But
group suffering will not occur if auditors can pass insurance costs on to their clients (and,
in turn, the public).66 Cost-passing reduces the deterrent effect of imposing the costs on
auditors (some deterrence may remain from risk of harm to reputation). Expanding
auditor liability would not help much either. Whether auditors can pass costs through is
uncertain, although public enterprises don’t have any choice but to hire an auditor and
choice is limited. On the other hand, insisting that auditors retain some liability risk
(through retentions) might incrementally frustrate their cost-passing ability (it may be
more convincing to defend high audit fees by citing high insurance premiums than by
citing losses incurred on liability claims).
2. Adverse Selection — As to adverse selection, ideally, a premium should equal
an insurer’s expected loss plus administrative costs and a fair profit.67 Yet it is rarely
practical to calculate each insured’s individual expected loss perfectly. The best that can
be done (at reasonable cost) is systematic classification of each insured into groups with
similar probabilistic attributes. For example, in automobile insurance, insureds may be
classified according to a combination of discrete attributes such as specific accident
histories (called “experience rated”) and whether the vehicles they drive are equipped
with air bags or not (called “feature rated”).
Risk classification grouping implies that, within groups, individuals pose different
risks while paying the same premium. As a result, more applicants will seek
classification in lower-risk/lower-premium groups. Resulting groups will have in them
more relatively higher-risk than lower-risk people for that classification. Insurers
respond to this adverse selection by estimating its effects using increasingly-refined
models that enable adjusting the scope of coverage and premium charged for each risk
group classification. These exercises are limited, however, and when the costs of
increasing refinement are greater than the benefits, no further refinement is made.
3. Monitoring — The monitoring-related limitations of using E&O insurance to
address audit failure risk are serious. First, auditor E&O insurance addresses an audit
firm’s exposure using general policies for specific time periods. They are not tailored to
particular audit engagements or associated risks of audit failure. Such coverage generality
may pose perverse incentive effects that prevent calibrating auditing tasks to the risks of
audit failure arising from particular engagements.

natural disaster (such as coastal areas), who also discount their purchase price in light of catastrophic risks
too.
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See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1644-49 (1994).
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In the market imagined above, supra note ___, the insurer’s total expected loss is $1,000 and with 100
people that means $10 each plus $5 for costs and profit.
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Second, and more importantly, this method separates the risk-monitoring function
from the risk-distribution function. That is, auditors are in control of their insured
activities with little or no oversight by insurers. Monitoring is a way to control risk but
when risk monitoring is separated from risk distribution, moral hazard increases. The
theoretical appeal of bundling monitoring and distribution evaporates to a point where
even second-best strategies of retentions are impaired.
Put differently, the issue raises a problem of asymmetric information when
considering the various constituents in the audit function. Relative access to information
is greatest among issuers, then auditors and then the latter’s external insurers. Issuers
have superior access to the basic financial data and are in the best position to determine
its reliability; auditors have superior knowledge in determining their capability of
assessing that information and thus estimating the risk of audit failure. Insurers must
rely upon abstract models and command data sufficient to validly estimate expected
losses from audit failure.
Exposure from audit failure is more difficult for insurers to evaluate, as it involves
matters of investor demographics. Estimating the magnitude of audit failure is more
uncertain when gauging the scope of claims is difficult (as by the number, identity or type
of third party shareholders or other investors who may assert them). Such informational
asymmetry can lead insurers to increase premiums or retentions, limit coverage or add
exclusions. When asymmetry is acute, premium surges may occur, which increase the
adverse selection that leads to lower-risk insureds withdrawing from pools. With only
high-risk insureds left, pools unravel, and self-insurance becomes the preferred route for
the low-risk and no insurance for the high-risk.
Consider an analogy from directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. Premiums
and coverage may provide clues about liability risk to the extent that they are valid
proxies for corporate governance quality.68 Yet scholars observe that D&O insurers do
not appear to have or act upon any monitoring incentives.69 While similar data on E&O
insurance does not appear to have been published, it is reasonable to suppose a similar
phenomenon in this line.70
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See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’
& Officers’ Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. ___ (2007); compare Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs.
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 1, at n. 337 (2002) (premiums for D&O insurance accurately reflect governance quality (citing, at
n. 337, John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the
Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000)).
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See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Gatekeeper: D&O Insurers, 95 GEO. L. J. ___ (2007);
see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities
Regulation, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7 (2002) (invoking this basis to question Professor Ronen’s
proposal, discussed below in this Article, favoring financial statement insurance).
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A policy parallel appears: commentators who lament unavailability of auditor E&O insurance and/or
rising liability risks dramatize their arguments by warning that the combination may drive auditors out of
the auditing business with calamitous effects while those lamenting the unavailability of D&O insurance
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4. Insurance Levers — As with all insurance products, the market for E&O
insurance changes dynamically in response to prevailing macroeconomic and social
conditions that have specific effects on insurance underwriting decisions. These factors
influence the supply of insurance available and its price (the premium) and are
characteristically used to describe aspects of the familiar “cycle explanation” for
insurance market dynamics. Thus, the thumb-nail sketch of such cyclicality provided
earlier can be explored more fully by considering underlying components of statistical
independence, adverse selection, and moral hazard (and the bearing of monitoring
capabilities on the latter). In particular, consider a few examples of how retentions can
be used to address each of these three components.
First, retentions enable insurers to neutralize correlations among risks that
otherwise impair insurance’s efficacy to pool and distribute them (i.e., to address reduced
independence of risks). That is, if all pool members are certain to suffer losses of a given
amount (say $100,000 per year), then there is no independence as to that amount. So it is
not susceptible to risk-pooling and distribution. Hence, deductibles rise to that level of
uniformly certain loss. Likewise, if all pool members are equally highly-likely to suffer
losses in a given category (say from secondary debt offerings of highly-leveraged
enterprises), then the low independence of that pool would increase the appeal of internal
retentions compared to external coverage.
Second, retentions address adverse selection by enabling insurers to distribute
total risk more heavily to high-risk than to low-risk insureds. This is because uniformly
high retentions for members of a pool have the effect of charging more losses to those
pool members that suffer claims more often or in higher amounts than other pool
members. High retentions are thus better for low-risk insureds than higher premiums are.
Their existence may suggest a strategy for redressing high risk-variability in a pool and
an effort, in response to external macro forces, to keep insurance “available.”
Third, retentions, as noted, reduce moral hazard. In part, this arises from how
they increase incentives for internal monitoring. Indeed, high retentions may reflect that
firms rather than external insurers are better able to monitor (evaluate and control)
associated risks. But the second-best strategy of replacing monitoring with retentions
becomes even less effective the more unbundled the risk monitoring and risk distribution
functions become. This insight contributes a partial explanation for why large auditing
firms initiated more ambitious self-insurance programs.
After all, volatility in E&O insurance markets also reflects competitive forces
prevalent in most insurance markets, which are financial in character and therefore pose
few structural limitations to industry expansion.71 Insurers face competition not only
amid rising liability risks do so by warning that the result may discourage talented and capable persons of
serving on corporate boards of directors.
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See Romano, What Went Wrong , supra note ___ at 18 (noting that capacity constraints or withdraws are
puzzles in a competitive insurance market where premiums should adjust to changing conditions but noting
how for professional liability insurance “desired terms of coverage—and for some firms any coverage—
became unavailable, at apparently any price.”); see also id. (noting how the capacity constraint story is hard
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from other insurers but from their customers and potential customers. Customers who
regularly negotiate with insurers over retentions increasingly appreciate the need to
develop formal strategies to manage and fund related risks. Customer responses vary
according to different risk classification groups. Among auditing firms, these
classifications parallel firm size (as large, mezzanine or smaller). In recent decades,
periods labeled “insurance crises” led the large firms to pursue more systematic programs
of self-insurance.
B. Self-Insurance Programs (SIPs)
Hard insurance markets, and perhaps other factors, lead insureds to strategy
options other than transferring risk, often called self-insurance. This is a colloquial term
that actually designates a complex variety of tools. In general, however, self-insurance
involves setting aside a portion of revenues from activity to meet losses should they
occur, a strategy that became increasingly common throughout the US economy in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.72 Of course, risk-retention devices prevalent in general
insurance contracts, such as deductibles and co-insurance, are a partial form of selfinsurance. What distinguishes the strategy usually described as self-insurance is a more
comprehensive program of reserving funds to pay losses, more fully internalizing those
risks.73
1. Large Firm Programs — It is a commonly-stated, although stylized, fact that
large audit firms have embarked on comprehensive self-insurance programs (SIPs), using
their own separately-organized insurance affiliates.74 Note, however, that public details
of such programs are scarce, as the audit firms are privately-held and do not produce the
kinds of disclosure that public enterprises do. Subject to this opacity, it is possible to
assemble a composite sketch of important outlines, including operational and
organizational scale, parameters of the programs and the types of reinsurance involved.
As to operational and organizational scale, consider, as a representative firm,
Deloitte (formerly called Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu). It is actually a network of some 70
to believe “Given that the input for insurance is wealth and not the physical capital of a factory which could
have productive capacity limits”).
72

See Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, supra note ___ , at ___
(documenting that “the extent of corporate self-insurance has increased substantially over time through the
creation of firm or industry captive insurance subsidiaries and industry-wide mutuals.”); see also id. at ___
(“the corporate purchase of commercial liability insurance has proven something of a puzzle because
corporations have many potential methods of diversifying to reduce the effect of potential losses”).
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More precise vocabulary distinguishes among self-insurance, self-funding (which, in turn, assumes the
various forms of retentions such as deductibles and co-insurance) and no insurance.
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See Talley, supra note ___ (noting “the stylized fact that, at least since the savings and loan crises of the
late 1980s, auditing firms have been effectively self-insured, often through “captive” (i.e., wholly-owned)
insurance companies”); Goldwasser, Arnold & Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability (2006), supra note ___,
at § 11.2 (“large [auditing] firms since the mid 1980s have been unable to purchase sufficient liability
insurance to satisfy their needs.”).
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different member firms organized in numerous jurisdictions of the world and operating in
149 different countries. As a whole, Deloitte claimed total worldwide revenues for 2006
of $20 billion and reported commanding total assets of $10 billion with total liabilities
plus partner capital of $6.4 billion.75 Deloitte’s public materials—and its internal training
programs—emphasize quality control throughout the organization and place a premium
on maintaining uniform standards across those firms, evidently to promote a sense of
single-firm identity within the network.76
The U.S. member firm of Deloitte is Deloitte USA. It provides services through
three main subsidiaries: Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP and Deloitte Consulting LLP.
These provide audit, tax, consulting and financial advisory services, respectively.
Deloitte USA contributed $9 billion of the Deloitte annual worldwide revenue and
employs 37,000 people (of whom 2,600 are partners; 27,000 are professional staff; and
7,500 are administrative staff; a total of about 8,000 CPAs are among the employees).
Deloitte USA operates through 98 US offices in 90 cities.
The other three large auditing firms present themselves in roughly similar (and
similarly vague) ways.77 All are networks comprised of scores of separate member firms,
all boast in the range of 100,000 employees, all generate annual revenue approaching $20
billion, and all derive revenue from three service categories: audit, tax and
consulting/advisory. For each firm, about half the total revenues are from audit and
assurance and the other half from the other activities. Some variation appears in
breakdowns of their respective service lines and by geographic regions of the world as
well as by industry specialization. Importantly, all four firms emphasize trans-network
quality control and uniformity as part of each firm’s investments in both human capital
and firm brand identity.
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Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, at 51-52. Note that these publicly-reported figures do not balance and
that Deloitte’s public reports offer no explanation. Perhaps the $3.6 billion difference between total assets
of $10 billion and total liabilities plus partner capital of $6.4 billion produces a functional insurance
reserve. Whether formally or even informally so denominated on the firms’ private financial statements,
some portion of the difference could be available to meet liability arising from audit failure. The full
amount, $3.6 billion, is considerably larger than Professor Talley’s “plausible range” of large firm viability
thresholds estimated at between $454 million and $2.15 billion. See Talley, supra note ___, at 1679.
Separately, of the reported total assets, accounts receivable appeared to be the largest portion, at $4.8
billion, with total current assets of $7.8 billion and total current liabilities of $3.6 billion (for $4.2 billion in
working capital). Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, at 51-52.
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See, e.g., Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, passim.
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As examples, PWC describes itself as comprised of many different firms, some large and some small. It
provides audit as well as non-audit and transactional services. PWC’s total worldwide revenues for 2006
were $20 billion. Likewise, KPMG describes itself as a “global network of professional service firms
providing audit, tax and advisory services.” It has a large number of “member firms” who together employ
113,000 persons worldwide, with 6,800 partners and operations in 148 countries. It has one member firm
in China and one member firm in the U.S. Total member revenues for 2006 were $16.9 billion (and in
2005 $15.7 billion).
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As to the nature of the firms’ SIPs, again while the firms provide scant public
details concerning them, the various alternative methods of self-insurance are wellrecognized. Consider two. In the captive form, an enterprise creates a wholly-owned
affiliate (domestic or, more frequently, off-shore) and contributes requisite capital. The
enterprise—and its designated component members, such as firms within a network—pay
periodic premiums to support network-wide coverage. The captive sometimes is
managed using a separate management company rather than the larger enterprise’s own
staff. While various attributes can be created, in general, the captive thus acts as the
enterprise’s primary insurer and usually also in turn obtains reinsurance policies to cover
portions of its exposure.78
In the mutual form—commonly used among industrial enterprises in given
industries—members coordinate to form what are commonly called risk-retention
pools.79 Participants contribute premiums to the mutual and it, in turn, covers member
losses on prescribed terms. The program often is designed using retrospectively rated
policies, meaning that each member pays premiums initially for agreed coverage, but the
premiums are later adjusted based on actual loss experience.80 If the member enjoys a
favorable loss experience, a portion of its initial premium is rebated, but if it suffers an
unfavorable loss experience, it pays an additional premium surcharge.
A SIP’s structure may be influenced by tax considerations. To the extent that an
enterprise allocates revenues to cover future legal liabilities in ways that impose
substantial limitations or restrictions on access to the funds, they are not includible in US
taxable income.81 While the exact requirements of this tax treatment are intricate82 and
78

A captive insurance affiliate can (a) use reinsurance or not and (b) insure only internal risks or also insure
external risks. Those not using reinsurance and covering only internal risks are in the exact position as the
simple residual self-insurance created under policies containing retentions—that is, the parent (or network)
does not transfer any risk. Those using reinsurance and covering only internal risks do transfer risk (so
long as the reinsurance is with reputable, liquid, solvent insurers and the premium is fixed). See David R.
Coburn & Stewar J. Kahn, Accounting and Auditing Aspects of Operating a Captive or Self-Insurance
Program, in PLI, Techniques of Self-Insurance 1987 (No. A4-4206).
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Examples of mutuals include Lumberman’s Mutual, Millers Mutual and Hardware Mutual.
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According to Professor Priest, “mutuals typically provide for subsequent assessments against firm
members based upon the liability experience of the mutual for the year.” Priest, Public Understanding of
Insurance, supra note ___, at 1012-13. That is, “mutuals set premiums by making assessments to member
firms after, rather than before, the loss experience, thus insuring for variations in loss among the firms, but
providing self-insurance for losses common to mutual members.” Id.
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See Dan L. Mendelson & Burton M. Mirsky, Malpractice Self-Insurance Plan Defers Income, 76 J.
TAX’N 16 (Jan. 1992) (reporting on IRS Letter Ruling 9136005 that fees deferred under medical
malpractice self-insurance arrangement are excludable from gross income until paid or made available
because they are subject to substantial limitations or restrictions, including that the firm only received them
to pay claims, on dissolution, or at a fixed date ten years later; also noting that the ruling likewise applies to
other professionals, including accountants).
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See IRS Letter Ruling 9136005 (1991) (interpreting Reg. 1.451-2).
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controversial as a policy matter,83 when properly designed, the benefits of self-insurance
can make it at least as appealing as paying regular premiums to an external insurer,
certainly at the level of periodic costs. Using separately-organized network affiliates,
whether captives or mutuals, can be a good way to establish the requisite restrictions on
use of funds.
As to the terms of reinsurance that the four large auditing firms’ SIP affiliates
obtain, once again, the firms provide little disclosure concerning these matters. But it
appears that these affiliates all obtain reinsurance for portions of network-wide exposure.
These reinsurance programs probably vary slightly across the four firms, especially as to
amounts, but again a fairly standardized picture emerges. In general, the reinsurance
policies resemble E&O policies in form, but appear to be more intricate, in the following
main ways.
First, the policies contain high retentions. The levels fluctuate over time, usually
in tandem with insurance pricing. For example, retentions ran to $25 million in the early
1990s and then grew to $45 million in the mid-1990s; they dropped to $20 million by the
end of that decade, before rising again in the 2000s.84 At present, retentions appear to
approximate $50 million.
Second, the policies are obtained from multiple insurers covering portions of
different layers of exposure and use high limits-of liability coverage. As an example, a
firm’s SIP reinsurance may provide “coverage for 85% of the layer covering $10 million
in excess of $50 million, 90% of a layer covering $20 million in excess of $60 million,
and 80% of the layer covering $20 million in excess of $75 million.”85
Third, while most insurance policies, including E&O insurance, are written using
standard forms with extensive boilerplate and minimal negotiation or tailoring, policies
for the four large auditing firms’ SIP affiliates are negotiated and tailored—usually issued
in typewritten form, containing non-standard terms and commonly described as
“manuscript policies.” 86
Finally, a related alternative is to use insurers not as a means to pool and
distribute risk as traditional insurance does but as a funding source to meet losses. Audit
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See, e.g., Karen Grant, Federal Tax Treatment of Medical Malpractice Insurance Alternatives for
Nonprofits, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 495 (2004).
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Id. Goldwasser, Arnold & Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability (2006), supra note ___, at § 11.2.
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Id. For example, assuming a $100 million covered loss, the firm pays a total of $57.5 million and
insurers pay $42.5 million: [.85 (60 - 50)] + [.90 (80 – 60)] + [.80 (95 -75)] = 8.5 + 18 + 16 = $42.5.
Assuming no other external coverage, for settlements greater than that, the firm pays 100% of the excess.
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Id. Manuscript policies are not common in primary insurance underwriting but are more the norm in
reinsurance underwriting, where the term “facultative” is also used (referring to the reinsurer’s “faculty” to
accept or deny risks) and in the programs that reinsurers use to reinsure their exposure, where the term
recessory is also used.
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firm SIP affiliates appear to execute financing agreements with their reinsurers. These
provide that the latter will fund losses on designated terms but require the firm to repay
those funds in full.87
2. Decisions to Self-Insure — A decision to self-insure or use external insurance
(with some self-funding) can be influenced by many factors, but ultimately must be based
on a comparative cost-benefit analysis. The threshold element in the decision is whether
the risk is calculable. An important requirement is that an enterprise operates using a
sufficient population of “homogenous exposure units . . . to allow an actuarially sound
calculation of risk.”88 For auditing firms, such units could include, for example, total
personnel, total professional personnel or total audit engagements.
So armed, the comparative set of costs are principally (a) the costs of obtaining
insurance, chiefly premiums (which, in turn, are comprised of insurer costs, surpluses and
profits) plus brokers’ or agents’ commissions versus (b) administrative costs of a program
(operations and maintenance, claims handling, and litigation). Quantifying the
comparison in abstract terms is impossible because too many variables are involved.
Indeed, comparative benefits are difficult even to state, as they range from internal loss
control capability and claims administration efficiency to external dynamics of litigation
and the power to manage it.
Nevertheless, simply viewing the question from a comparative cost-benefit
perspective suggests that characterizations such as whether a risk is “insurable” or
“uninsurable” can be imprecise. For example, it may be superficial to say that selfinsurance arose among the four large auditing firms because insurers regard the risk as
“too high” or “too unpredictable.” It can likewise appear facile to opine that such
conclusions are due to expansion of legal liability that auditors face. Indeed, that claim is
somewhat counterfactual in the current period, given how the PSLRA, SLUSA and
Central Bank all reduced such exposure and how empirical data show a decline in the
frequency of suits against auditors.89
True, as noted, factors that affect the comparative cost-benefit analysis vary with
the circumstances creating hard external insurance markets, which can include both legal
uncertainty and legal liability risks. Yet, those circumstances of the macro-environment
are influenced, more fundamentally, by micro factors, and these provide a more concrete
analytical basis for exploring the comparative calculus than conclusions about whether
risks are insurable or not.
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The question is whether it is more efficient (or cost-effective) for a party to obtain
external insurance or create self-insurance.90 The answer depends on whether the party
or an external insurer is better positioned to monitor and distribute (pool) the risk. Since
firms and insurers have some capacity to diversify risks, the issue is ultimately which has
the superior ability to do so. That hinges, in turn and in general, on risk independence,
adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring capability. Consider each point.
As to risk independence, for insurance to be appealingly-priced, risks that
insureds within a pool face cannot be too highly correlated. There must be sufficient
statistical independence for an insurer to make valid predictions that the aggregate
premium and investment income from the pool will be sufficient to fund reserves to meet
loss payouts, including covering administrative costs and providing a profit. If requisite
insurer reserves equal or exceed those that a self-insuring firm would require, it is more
effective for a firm to self-insure.
If the four large auditing firms operate SIPs akin to the mutual form used by
industrial enterprises, this could reflect decreased risk independence over time (which
may be due to many factors, including legal liability or to increasing uniformity in audit
quality achieved by increasing homogeneity among the large firms). Mutuals may be
better than external insurers at furnishing coverage for any loss category in which there is
substantial correlation among members. The external insurer’s solution to the challenge
would be to offer coverage for some group losses but with exclusions for the highlycorrelated type. Yet defining the highly-correlated type contractually can be difficult and
the difficulty may make external insurers a less effective discriminator compared to how
the mutual approach can enable members to pool individual member risks (of all sorts)
while also covering all group losses.
As to adverse selection, it can be exacerbated when there is an acutely wide
disparity of risk profiles in a single insurance pool. At an extreme, no insurer can sustain
such pools and too few low-risk insureds will remain in them so that the pool can unravel
and the market for that insurance disappear. To say that the risk is “uninsurable,”
however, remains imprecise. It means that insureds who are otherwise candidates for that
pool will not participate in it because they are better off meeting the risk by other means.
Of course, the word “uninsurable” may be apt to the extent that the absence of low-risk
insureds means that insurers will not make the insurance available to high-risk insureds.
Acute adverse selection arising from highly-disparate risks means that there is so
much variation among pool members or candidates that insurers cannot effectively
segregate low-risk from high-risk members and thus offer equivalent insurance terms (as
to premiums, retentions and exclusions/coverage (limits-of-liability)). When that occurs,
lower-risk members will not participate because what they pay and receive is worth less
than the risk that they would contribute to the pool. At the extreme, that could mean that
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the particular insurance product is unavailable to anyone and to that extent the related
risks may be described as “uninsurable.”
As to moral hazard and monitoring, self-insurance bundles risk-monitoring and
risk-distribution functions, as noted. Whereas E&O insurance separates risk-monitoring
from risk-distribution, self-insurance combines the two. Risk-monitoring is performed by
the same enterprise that distributes the risk. Within the networks that constitute each of
the four large auditing firms, members may eliminate the costs of moral hazard (and
adverse selection). At minimum, the network character of the firms enables internal
monitoring in ways that external insurers cannot replicate. This appears particularly
likely given how each of the four large firms devotes considerable resources to promoting
uniform internal quality-control programs.
All or some combination of the foregoing factors likely have played some role in
the decisions that the four large auditing firms have made to engage in substantial selfinsurance programs.91 No firm would have opted for a self-insurance program unless it
had determined that the costs of supporting it are less than premiums (and commissions)
required to buy equivalent external insurance. This determination is based on either
knowledge or belief that the risk it would otherwise contribute to an external insurance
pool (for a given price) is less than the risk it actually brings to that pool (the price should
be lower). The self-insuring firm determines, in other words, that it can bear the risk
more cost-effectively than paying the price an external insurer charges to pool that risk
for it.
Two additional factors may help to explain the rise and persistence of SIPs among
the four large auditing firms, as well as why the medium and smaller firms have not
tended to opt for such ambitious programs. The first is a path dependence story. Once
induced to adopt SIPs due to macro-events plus the scale that makes them possible, with
a formal program established, it may be more cost-effective to sustain it permanently than
allow it to fluctuate according to the relative supply and pricing of E&O insurance.
The second is a wealth story. Risk aversion can vary with the net worth of a
decision-maker, with those having fewer resources being more risk averse and those
commanding considerable resources being less risk averse.92 It is possible that smaller
public accounting firms are more risk averse than the four large firms. If so, this also
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See Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note ___ at 27:
[discussing directors’ and officers’ insurance and noting that issuers are] often better
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control. This situation may be one of the reasons for the rise in policyholder-formed
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would explain why they show a stronger appetite for self-insurance compared to smaller
firms. Put differently, the larger firms may be more willing to take chances than smaller
ones.93
This analysis does not negate the possibility that expanded legal liability may
explain the rise of SIPs among the four large auditing firms—or that legal uncertainty and
associated catastrophic risk may continue to play a role in their continued use.94 Indeed,
this is a common theory of the rise of self-insurance programs throughout the US
economy in recent decades. 95 For example, for corporations generally, expanded tort
liability increases risk variability by shifting the burden of losses from first to third
parties (from violators to insurers), thus encouraging adverse selection (meaning highrisk insureds seek out pools containing low-risk insureds). It also reduces risk
independence because tort-expanding laws are or can be systemic rather than discrete,
putting all pool members or candidates at increasingly uniform levels of risk.96
This account appears to be plausible both for many industries generally and
possibly for auditing in particular. Consider, for example, the empirical frequency and
magnitude of securities fraud class action claims against auditing firms. Their statistical
distribution exhibits greater density in the right tail than under a normal distribution,
meaning there are a larger number of larger risks.97 Such fat-tail distributions present an
exception to basic principles of risk distribution through diversification that support
establishing insurance pools. While basic theory prescribes diversifying risk away by
adding to a portfolio, for fat-tail distributions the opposite obtains (not to diversify) as
each additional investment increases risk. If this occurs in the large audit firm insurance
market, it could explain insurer reluctance to provide E&O insurance and the rise of SIPs
among large auditing firms.
Yet this general critique as applied to auditing may insufficiently account for
matters of adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring in the audit function.98
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Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note ___ at 15 (citing Ralph K. Winter, “Crises” in Competitive
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Consider alternative interpretations of the data that do so. Moral hazard and adverse
selection can lead to premiums greater than insureds are willing to pay. That is, an
insurer may determine, under adverse selection, that policies would underwrite industry
“lemons.” That could lead them to price policies so high that the non-lemon insureds opt
out of the pool. The non-lemons are those insureds capable and willing to engage in
sufficient risk monitoring on their own to reduce the probability of loss and its magnitude
should it occur.
Among the large auditing firms, this would mean that they have simply become
the lower cost avoider compared to external insurers.99 Accordingly, while liability and
catastrophic risk may partially explain the rise of SIPs and decline of attractively priced
E&O insurance, these basic components of insurance analysis—and the effects of scale
that the SIP affiliates command—contribute at least equally important explanations.100
This tentative conclusion is reinforced by an analytical view of the strategies
available to insurers seeking to provide insurance at prices that customers find appealing.
In theory, the pool premium on every insurance pool should be measured according to the
pool’s average risk.101 If so, the pool premium exceeds the risk that low-risk members
contribute. When risk variability increases, that gap increases (low-risk insureds pay
even more than the risk they contribute). Low-risk insureds are thus the marginal buyers
and insurers compete to obtain their business. Competition may include refining pool
categories and putting channeling customers into lower-risk pools with lower premiums
or better terms, which insurers attempt to do by more accurate risk-segregation and
discrimination methods.
To work, the strategy requires insurer ability to conduct sufficient monitoring of
their customers. For that to be cost effective, in turn, the cost of refining the
classifications must be less than the gains from attracting targeted business. But high
risk-variability pools limit an insurer’s ability to compete effectively in this way and
discourage low-risk customers from buying offered policies. Monitoring is central to this
exercise and this supports the view that the capacity of SIPs to combine risk monitoring
with risk distribution renders them a potentially superior model of insuring audit failure
Insurance Markets, Hoover Inst. of Stan. U. Working Papers in Econ., No. E-86-74, at 4 (Dec. 1986) as
“arguing dependent risks, that is, nondiversifiability in the insurance market, should not matter in a stock
market economy because insurers could diversify those risks in the capital market”).
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than E&O insurance. While still not conclusive, it casts analytical doubt upon the
persuasiveness of insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps on auditor liability.
Even if incorrect, it seems premature to accept the argument without considering
potential models of insuring audit failure yet untried.
III. POTENTIAL INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE
While E&O insurance and self-insurance programs are the extant models to
address liability for audit failure, two alternatives deserve further exploration as a matter
of public policy: financial statement insurance and insurance-based securitization.
Previous proposals concerning financial statement insurance are summarized briefly
before presenting the novel alternative of adapting insurance-based securitization to
address catastrophic audit failure risk.
A. Financial Statement Insurance (FSI)
Financial statement insurance (FSI), was introduced by New York University
Accounting Professor Joshua Ronen102 and I have elaborated upon it in a series of
articles.103 While not yet in place on a large scale for public companies, embryonic
versions of FSI are used in private market merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions
and analogues are in use in other contexts. This vehicle offers numerous attractions,
including not only a way to establish functional caps on auditor liability and address
relatively ordinary risks of audit failure, but several other benefits of transparency and
monitoring compared to existing practice.
1. Structure — FSI’s basic idea is simple. In M&A transactions, a seller
represents that its financial statements fairly present financial condition and results in
conformity with GAAP; an insurer engages an auditor to review the statements and backs
the representation with insurance.104 Should the seller breach that representation—
equivalent to audit failure—the insured pays losses up to the contractually agreed upon
amount.105
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To put FSI to work on the broad scale necessary for public companies and their
auditors, several somewhat radical structural changes would occur. Rather than an issuer
engaging an auditor whose liability risks are backed by E&O insurance or self-insurance,
issuers buy insurance directly from an insurer. The insurance policy covers a given set of
financial statements in exchange for a premium, which the insurer sets, in part, based on a
preliminary audit of the issuer using an auditor that the insurer hires. A final audit is
performed before the policy is issued and coverage is established for those financial
statements. If losses occur, the insurer pays covered losses, in accordance with the
policy’s limits of liability. Benefits of this structure include removing the inherent
conflict of interest that arises when issuers hire and pay auditors to give opinions on their
financial statements.
In addition to these changes to structural features, the proposed FSI regime calls
for issuers to disclose publicly the premium they are charged and the amount of related
coverage they obtain (including any details as to deductibles, exclusions and so on). This
disclosure is designed to provide public information concerning financial statement
reliability. Investors and analysts would be able to calculate statistically-valid
comparisons of relative financial statement integrity among issuers. Thus in addition to
eliminating conflict-of-interest embedded in the traditional audit function, new
transparency arises that is lacking in the current regime in which auditors issue the
identical three-paragraph opinion for the financial statements of enterprises having vastly
different (and individually unique) accounting circumstances.
2. Advantages — Beyond these attractions of FSI compared to traditional
practice, FSI has implications for insurance analysis that reveal additional advantages.
As to moral hazard, FSI can potentially eliminate it. FSI moves auditors into the liability
background. Auditors become insurer employees, and subject to supervision,
compensation and termination by them. Thus auditors no longer face any insurancebased decisions that are prone to creating moral hazard. FSI also essentially eliminates
the traditional concerns of adverse selection. It does so because it is an entirely different
product compared to traditional categories of insurance such as professional liability
insurance (or casualty or property insurance). Rather, among insurance products, FSI is
akin to title insurance, an otherwise sui genersis insurance line.
Title insurance is coverage concerning risks of defects in legal title to real
property. Home sellers represent ownership of title to buyers and, when transferring their
interest, provide buyers title insurance policies supporting the representation. If the seller
breaches the representation, the insurer defends the buyer’s claim of title against third
parties and pays the buyer’s damages arising from the third party’s successful assertion
against the buyer’s title. Title insurance is retroactive in character in the sense that it
covers matters arising before the policy issuance date.

http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2002/mamorskyj_06a.asp (terms of audit as condition to insurance
eligibility).
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Analogously, FSI insures a particular year’s financial statements, with coverage
extending to discoveries made in future periods. FSI covers accounting irregularities
reflected in financial statements of a prior period. FSI and title insurance both solve a
problem of incomplete information: with title insurance, the quality of a seller’s title, and
with FSI, the quality of a company’s financial statements. In contrast, E&O insurance is
less about incomplete information than about behavioral and performance risks. While
the costs of adverse selection can be considerable in underwriting E&O insurance, the
cost essentially disappears under FSI.
As to monitoring, FSI contributes superior results compared to E&O insurance—
and a different form of monitoring compared to SIPs. Unlike most insurance lines,
including E&O insurance, a substantial portion of premiums received on title insurance
policies are used to fund investigation rather than payouts, administrative costs and
profits.106 Title insurers engage (and FSI insurers would engage) risk-assessment using
particularized investigations concerning the specific attributes of an insured matter
(property and zoning records for title insurance and specific financial statements for
FSI).107
As a result, FSI amounts to a bundling of the monitoring and risk distribution
functions into the insurers. Of course, SIPs likewise bundle the two, although they
bundle them inward within the audit firm or network instead of outward to the insurer. In
contrast, as noted, E&O insurance separates the two functions. Consequently, E&O
insurance may not produce optimal insurer investigation.
FSI provides monitoring incentives on insurers that differ from those insurers face
when underwriting E&O insurance. E&O policies provide general coverage for a broad
range of activities, including all audit engagements plus tax and other consulting services.
The same is essentially true for the SIPs that the large auditing firms use. In contrast,
each FSI is tailored to a particular audit engagement with associated risk, premium, and
coverage. Audit effectiveness and auditor performance bear directly on financial
statement and reporting quality. Under FSI, auditor review and opinions are imminent
monitoring functions—they are the essence of the concept.
As noted, SIPs and FSI thus both bundle monitoring and risk distribution, but into
different locations. With SIPs, the monitoring and risk functions are bundled within the
audit firm (bundled-in) whereas with FSI the functions are bundled out to the insurer
(bundled-out). Which is better is a function of which bundling more nearly optimizes
between being least costly and most effective. This is an empirical question for which no
data exist, of course. An analytical case could be to favor one or the other but such an
assessment is likely to produce a draw. That is, for the audit function, the idea of
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bundling may likely be superior to separation, but there is no a priori reason to conclude
that the two are better bundled-in or bundled-out.
Assuming a draw on the relative merits of bundling-in or bundling-out, the case
still may be made to favor one or the other for separate reasons. Appealing about SIPs is
conservatism—it is the status quo and requires no changes, political or otherwise.
Appealing about FSI are (1) severing the longstanding conflict-of-interest that bedevils
the audit function when issuers pay those who opine on their financial statements and (2)
the unprecedented production of a financial statement reliability index.
FSI could produce another advantage by using option markets as functional
reinsurance. Investors would write and sell put options to FSI insurers respecting stock
of covered companies.108 Puts would give insurers the right to sell covered stock to
investors during a stated period upon the occurrence of stated events at a stated exercise
price. Duration and triggering events would be co-extensive with the FSI policy period
and triggering events (essentially, audit failure). Investors would sell the puts for a price
less than the price of general options on the same stock (i.e., those whose exercise is not
conditional on audit failure) and that price would essentially represent a reinsurance
premium from the insurer’s viewpoint. Upon a triggering event, stock price likely would
fall below the exercise price, enticing the insurer to exercise the option and establishing
functional re-insurance. Investors writing numerous puts on a large number of stocks
enable designing a diversified portfolio of FSI puts.
Also appealing is how the installation of the insurance industry into the forefront
of the financial reporting system increases significantly the number of competitors to this
marketplace. With SIPs, there are only four firms capable of auditing the vast majority of
public enterprises. This poses considerable systemic risk should any audit failure
threaten the viability of any one of them (and this, in turn, creates significant moral
hazard among auditors who may behave as if their firms are too big to fail). FSI has
comparative appeal because dozens of insurers are capable of underwriting it.
This conclusion need not rule out the possibility of sustaining SIPs, however. FSI
and SIPs both can be used—they are not mutually exclusive. Audit firms can continue
operating SIPs but also embark on an FSI regime by holding out their SIPs among those
FSI insurers competing for issuer audit insurance work. So, for example, Procter &
Gamble could hire Chubb to write FSI for it and Chubb can in turn hire Deloitte’s
auditing arm to provide the investigation. Alternatively, Procter & Gamble could hire
Deloitte’s SIP affiliate to write FSI and have it, in turn, engage Deloitte’s auditing arm to
provide the assurance.109
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Inviting auditing firms to use their SIP affiliates to underwrite FSI raises a question concerning whether
this would mean that the firms thus engage in “the business of insurance.” If so, state insurance regulations
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concerning the firms’ existing SIP programs and, in both SIPs and FSI, good arguments suggest that the
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Financial statement insurance can provide a mechanism to establish the functional
equivalent of a damages cap for audit failure. The cap does not directly apply to auditors,
of course, for they face no liability to investors (they may face contractual and other
liability for transgressions to their insurer employers). The cap is established through the
policy terms reached between issuers and insurers which, in turn, would be disclosed to
public capital markets ex ante and enable investors to make capital allocation decisions
accordingly (based on measurable resources available in the event of audit failure and the
transparent financial statement reliability index). To this extent, FSI furnishes support for
quotidian cases of audit failure well but perhaps not catastrophic cases. Insurance-based
securitization can address the latter.
B. Insurance-Based Securitization (IBS)
Insurance-based securitization is a novel innovation that would distribute risk of
audit failure through capital markets and specifically addresses concerns about
catastrophic risks. Securitization refers to the practice of packaging into securities some
underlying set of economic attributes, usually cash flows and related risks. It is a
decades-old practice that began when mortgage lenders pooled loans that they had written
into grantor trusts which then issued securities to the public backed by cash flows on
those loans and subject to borrower default risk.
A proliferation of pooled assets ensued, encompassing automobile and boat loans,
credit card receivables, and projected cash flows from computer leases and popular
musical recording contracts. In credit card deals, for example, a bank generates credit
card receivables and faces related consumer default risk while tying up its cash. In a
securitization, it transfers the latter burdens by selling the receivables to a grantor trust
(or other special purpose entity or SPE) for cash supplied by investors. Investors, in turn,
enjoy a return on investment in accordance with that default risk—which, for portions of
the capital markets, increases financial diversification. By isolating the assets in the SPE,
moreover, investors look solely to the credit risk of the pool, not to that of the originating
bank.
The basic insight underlying asset-backed securities motivates insurance-based
securitization (IBS), although they involve different sides of the balance sheet. Whereas
asset-backed securitization involves the transfer of assets to an SPE, insurance-based
securitization involves essentially the transfer of liabilities to an SPE. That is, the SPE
attracts investors who are willing to take a risk that designated insured risks will
materialize, which reduces or eliminates the principal they are owed, in exchange for a
relatively high interest rate to compensate for that risk (along with the possibility that the
full principal will be repaid).
Since the mid-1990s, insurance based-securitization has become increasingly used
by insurers—and several non-insurance businesses—to protect against exposure to
catastrophic risks for which traditional insurance (or reinsurance) is either unavailable or

38

comparatively expensive. Following this innovation, auditing firms concerned about the
catastrophic risk that a massive audit failure could wreak—the dissolution of one of the
four remaining firms—should find insurance-based securitization attractive.
1. The Market — In the mid-1990s, following the natural catastrophes of
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge, California earthquake, insurance capacity to cover
catastrophic risks contracted significantly.110 This led innovators to adapt securitization
to fill the gap.111 Resulting products are sometimes collectively called “risk-linked
securities.” The most common of these are called catastrophe bonds (nicknamed cat
bonds),112 because the risks they address have historically been called catastrophe risks
(some are called super catastrophic risks). These are low-probability, high-magnitude
events, commonly illustrated by natural disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes and
tornados, but including man-made events such as terrorist attacks and financial
calamities.113
In a basic “cat-bond” deal structure, an investment bank or insurance company
creates a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE is usually located offshore, mainly to
avoid adverse US income tax consequences. The SPE issues bonds in a private
placement to qualified institutional investors. The bonds usually carry a floating interest
rate with a significant spread above LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate, the rate
that large international banks charge each other for sizable loans).
Cash flows into the SPE from three sources: insurance premiums from the insurer
(or reinsurer), the principal investment of investors and investment income on its funds
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(these are usually fixed rate returns which are then swapped with a creditworthy
counterparty who pays LIBOR-based floating rates for on-payment to investors). Cash
flows out of the SPE in the form of periodic interest to investors along with a return of
principal at the end of its term.
During the term, the SPE holds funds in trust and invests them in designated
classes of securities (usually US government bonds or other high-grade securities). If the
catastrophe does not occur, the SPE returns principal to the investors and terminates its
existence; but if the catastrophe occurs, principal that otherwise would be paid to
investors is instead paid to the sponsor. It is conceptually—if not mechanically or
technically—akin to the risk of corporate insolvency that investors in traditional
corporate bonds face.
The IBS market is young and thin, but has steadily expanded. The first IBS
transaction closed in 1995 and involved $84 million of coverage; in 1998, 18 deals were
closed involving a total of $2.5 billion;114 from 1999 through 2004, some 50 additional
transactions were closed, most by insurers, and averaging about $100 million each.115 In
1999, Oriental Land Company became the first non-insurer to issue a catastrophe bond116
and, in 2002, the Hollywood-based movie company, Vivendi International, closed an IBS
transaction with coverage of up to $175 million for losses arising from earthquakes in
Southern California.117 While most estimates indicate that the IBS market is not
inconsiderable,118 it remains a small share of the overall reinsurance market—less than
half of a percent according to one estimate.119
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2. Structuring Challenges — Despite steady growth in the IBS market, several
complexities associated with many of the transactions—especially those initiated by
insurers—help to explain why it will take time for the market to blossom fully. While all
these complexities have been overcome for insurers wishing to sponsor deals, if slowly,
they are essentially either non-existent for auditing firms and their SIP affiliates or have
been sufficiently plowed in previous transactions so that the road is substantially paved
for auditing firms to close IBS transactions. This is especially likely that Oriental Land
Company and Vivendi International, both non-insurers, successfully did so. Consider
each of the hurdles, how the industry has met them so far, and how much easier it would
be for auditing firms to follow suit.
First, as a preliminary matter, transaction costs can be high. These include the
costs of securities underwriting, legal advice, accounting support, risk evaluation, rating
agency assessments and communicating information to investors.
These costs
accompany any securities offering, of course, but can be higher for IBS transactions than
traditional corporate bond or equity offerings and even higher compared to conventional
asset-backed securitizations. For auditing firms, however, the real question is comparing
the costs of IBS to the costs associated with retaining the catastrophic risk through selfinsurance programs or laying-off portions through reinsurance arrangements. To the
extent that the claimed inability or expense of doing either is exorbitant, the costs of
arranging an IBS deal should make it cost-effective.120
Second, taxation matters. To be cost-effective, the SPE must enjoy “passthrough” tax treatment.121 That is, if the SPE were taxed on its income (from premiums
received and from investments) and investors were likewise taxed on their investment
income, the double tax would render many SPE transactions non-cost-effective. At
present, transactions using SPEs based in the US result in such double-taxation. True, the
bonds could be offered only to tax-exempt investors but that is only a partial solution.
Better is to locate the SPE outside the US—and have no other connections with the US—
to avoid US entity-level income taxes.122 Many jurisdictions offer such pass-through
treatment, including Bermuda and Cayman Islands, and most IBS SPEs are located in
those places.123 This should present no problem to the auditing firms—they can simply
locate an SPE in the same off-shore jurisdiction that their SIP affiliates are located.
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Third, US GAAP imposes special accounting rules for SPEs. The principal ones
are the independent capital investment requirements. These require an SPE’s outside
investor to control a majority of the equity and own at least 3% of the total capital, in
order to permit the assets and liabilities of sponsored SPEs to be removed from the
sponsor’s balance sheet. These requirements can easily be met and probably do not
matter to auditing firms in any event—they do not publish public financial statements and
any internal financial statements (or those supplied to third parties) can provide relevant
disclosure to explain the arrangement.
Fourth, insurers are subject to specialized accounting and capital rules that
regulate the circumstances under which obtaining reinsurance generates credits for their
own risk profile.124 If they cannot be sure that transferring risk to an SPE will entitle
them to such credits, the transactions are less appealing. This concern will not apply to
auditors or their SIP affiliates because they are not subject to such regulation. It
nevertheless is worth describing, as it is implicated and addressed in existing IBS
transactions by the approach to determining whether a catastrophe occurs, which can
vary. This variability can make audit firm IBS transactions more attractive.
Determining whether a catastrophe occurs for an IBS transaction essentially
entails two specifications: what triggers a principal loss and by what formula the amount
is determined. For this purpose, it is common and useful to contrast indemnity from nonindemnity coverage. Under indemnity coverage, an insurer or reinsurer pays claims
based on those actually incurred (say, actual earthquake-caused damages) whereas under
non-indemnity coverage, the insurer or reinsurer pays claims based on the occurrence or
non-occurrence of a particular event that is not necessarily related to actual incurred
claims (say, an earthquake registering more than 7 on the Richter scale). Cat bond deals
can be designed either way.
In reinsurance practice, insurers generally prefer indemnity policies as they
precisely cover losses actually incurred. But re-insurers prefer non-indemnity policies to
the extent that they face risks of poor underwriting decisions or claims management by
insurers—forms of moral hazard.125 Non-indemnity approaches can neutralize moral
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The GAO explains:
In receiving “credit” for reinsurance, an insurance company may count the payments
owed it from the reinsurance company on claims it has paid as an asset or as a deduction
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requirements established by regulators. The ability to record an asset or to take a
deduction from gross liability for reinsurance is consequent upon the transfer of risk and
can strongly affect an insurance company’s financial condition.
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hazard. They tie principal repayment not to actual claims, which may be infected by poor
underwriting or by poor claims settlement procedures, but to objective external indicia of
loss, such as a 7+Richter earthquake.126 The accounting treatment for the two approaches
differs under specialized accounting regulations applicable to insurance companies. The
indemnity-based approach enables achieving so-called “underwriting accounting
treatment,” meaning the insurer has ceded its exposure and gets credit as reinsurance—
another reason that insurers generally prefer it.127
That accounting treatment is more difficult to achieve using non-indemnity based
approaches. Under them, the ceding insurer is exposed to basis risk—the risk of a
difference between payments received from the reinsurance coverage and actual losses
(this can go either way, with more or less principal received compared to losses actually
incurred). To achieve underwriting accounting treatment for non-indemnity transfers, the
insurer must design the model or method used to determine the trigger and amount so that
the result bears a sufficiently close nexus to its associated actual claims to justify treating
it as ceded (low basis risk).
While these problems have required cat bond market participants to struggle, they
are essentially non-existent for auditing firms. Their SIP affiliates are not subject to the
same regulations or accounting rules as insurers and reinsurers. From an accounting
viewpoint, they need not worry about whether indemnity or non-indemnity methods are
superior. They and investors may have preferences as between the alternative models, of
course, but that should make the vehicle more appealing rather than less. In particular,
experimentation and variation using the indemnity or non-indemnity approaches can be
pursued to address various forms of moral hazard.128
Fifth, investor appetites are obviously crucial to creating any IBS transaction or
market, including those for auditing firms.129 Investor appetites for IBS remain emergent
rather than strong, for several reasons. As noted, information costs can be high due to
lack of familiarity. True, the potential loss of principal in an IBS transaction can be
conceptually analogized to the risk of loss on corporate bonds arising from corporate
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insolvency. But investors have well-developed analytical tools for assessing that risk
based on capital structure, leverage, cash flow coverage ratios and other traditional tools.
It is more difficult for even the seasoned sophisticated investor to assess the probability
and magnitude of catastrophic risks, whether of hurricanes or mega-audit failures.
For IBS to appeal to investors, they must be capable of evaluating such risk (in
probability and magnitude), establishing the necessary return and assessing how that riskreturn relationship can contribute to investment portfolio diversification. While some
investors obviously have developed this capability and invested in IBS, additional
resources are needed. At present, two highly specialized professional groups are
available to contribute expert assessments and translate related knowledge.
The first are risk-modeling firms, which ISB sponsors invariably retain to provide
specialized risk evaluation appraisals. Three major catastrophe-modeling firms have long
served traditional reinsurers in assessing catastrophic risk.130 They have helped to
develop the IBS market by contributing analysis for individual catastrophe bond
offerings. These firms command considerable expertise, computing capability and
statistical modeling tools. Staffed with impressively educated professionals (many of
whom hold Ph.D.s in relevant fields), they use massive databases on past catastrophes
and related variables (such as population densities or construction techniques) to provide
state-of-the-art risk assessments.
The second knowledge source is from rating agencies, which invariably are
retained to rate catastrophe bonds. Three major rating agencies have long served the
bond markets in assessing investment risk (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s). For
IBS, they incorporate the analyses provided by the risk modelers and then extend or
refine it and express the results in terms of investment risk. Rating agency analyses
vary, but generally assess probability of loss and magnitude.131 Catastrophe bonds have
mostly been rated non-investment grade, although some have been rated investment
grade and some have been structured using multiple tranches, with the senior tranche
rated investment grade and the junior tranches below that.
Catastrophe bonds have been offered exclusively as private placements rather
than public offerings. Investors have been a relatively small group of sophisticated
institutions. Some of these include mutual funds, however, so individual investors have
enjoyed an opportunity to participate indirectly in these vehicles.132 Mutual fund
managers, in particular, have expressed appreciation for the diversification contribution
that catastrophe bonds can make to a portfolio.133
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3. Design Requirements — Apart from the foregoing challenges to developing
the market and IBS structure, two additional design features are critical to making an IBS
transaction work (and also require promoting investor understanding). First, the SPE
must be bankruptcy-remote, meaning it would not be consolidated with the sponsor’s
estate in the event of the latter’s bankruptcy.134 Investors would remain entitled to the
contractual cash flows independent of the sponsor’s financial position (subject only to the
designated catastrophic risks).
In asset-backed securitizations, such consolidation risk is addressed mainly by
assuring that the initial transfer of assets is a “true sale” rather than a secured lending.
That way, the sponsor’s creditors cannot claim any right to the transferred assets. In a
dispute, the investors would fight with the sponsor’s creditors over claims to those assets.
IBS deals are easier because the sponsor transfers no assets at the outset. Rather, an IBS
sponsor’s creditors could at most claim some right to contractual payment obligations
that the sponsor has to the SPE (essentially, premiums). This risk is addressed by
contractual provisions stating that, if the sponsor fails to pay premiums, then the coverage
terminates and all principal is retained by the SPE for investors.
Premiums could cease in two different scenarios. First, they could cease because
of sponsor insolvency after a covered loss occurs. In that case, the coverage is triggered
and the funds are released pursuant to the contract. No fight with sponsor creditors
occurs. Or premiums could cease because of insolvency arising for other reasons. In that
case, the coverage is not triggered and the SPE would seek to retain the funds for
payment to investors. This scenario can create competition with the sponsor’s other
creditors. Accordingly, ex ante assurance of bankruptcy remoteness remains important in
IBS transactions.135
This point leads to a second requisite design feature for effective IBS deals and
related investor understanding. In asset-backed securitizations, investor principal upon
closing is transferred to the sponsor in exchange for assets. In IBS, reflecting the
characteristic of an insurance arrangement, investor principal upon closing is held in the
SPE and invested. So in the former, the SPE is essentially passive (holding the assets and
servicing them, with the servicing usually outsourced by contract back to the sponsor).
For IBS, the SPE is more active: it holds assets, invests them, manages receipt of
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premiums and evaluates and settles claims arising under the coverage. This requires
attention to the SPE’s identity and management.
In particular, the SPE must be managed by experts possessing appropriate
investment and management skill. Those managers must follow management and
investment principles that assure the SPE’s safety and soundness. As examples, they
must assure that bond proceeds are invested prudently, assure that premiums are paid
from the sponsor when due and that swap payments of the swap counterparty are paid
when due.136 Assuring these traits and performance of these duties is principally a
market problem—investors must scrutinize the manager and the management contract
and avoid investing absent sufficient assurance of safety and soundness.137
4. Illustration and Assessment — Consider for illustration a simple example of an
IBS auditing transaction sponsored by one of the four large auditing firms (say Deloitte).
Deloitte’s SIP affiliate creates a bankruptcy-remote SPE based in Bermuda. The deal
provides insurance to the Deloitte affiliate for the ensuing 12 months covering specified
auditing-related events occurring during that period. Investors contribute $250 million of
principal amount in exchange for a floating interest rate of LIBOR +7%.
Investor risk of loss is either indemnity-based or non-indemnity based. If
indemnity-based, it could provide that investors lose principal dollar-for-dollar if, during
those 12 months, Deloitte settles or is adjudged liable in a single lawsuit alleging audit
failure in which settlement or damages exceed $500 million. If non-indemnity based,
principal reductions could be determined by reference to any of various objective
indicators outside the firm’s direct control. An example would be if total settlements by
or judgments against public auditing firms in the United States exceed $2 billion during
that 12-month period, then investors release dollar-for-dollar in excess of that up to the
total $250 million principal invested.138 In either case, an independent agent must be
appointed to verify that a triggering event has occurred, akin to the provision in standard
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insurance agreements providing that an insured cannot agree to settle a claim without the
insurer’s assent.
Proceeds from the securities issuance are deposited into a collateral trust account
and invested in US-government guaranteed securities or highly-rated commercial paper
(and the SPE enters into a suitable interest-rate swap with a credit-worthy counterparty).
The securities are offered only to qualified institutional buyers as defined in SEC Rule
144A. The bonds are rated based, in part, on a risk analysis of a catastrophe-modeling
firm and in part on rating agencies’ own investment risk assessment models.139
__________
Catastrophic risks are peculiar in that their frequency is low but their magnitude is
huge. The consequence of this peculiarity for insurers is that the cost of re-insurance can
be significantly higher than for other pools. For some coverage, this can mean that
reinsurers simply lack sufficient capital to meet aggregate risks. An example concerns
the risk of floods in certain coastal environments, and explains why the US government
developed government-backed flood insurance programs. For such contexts, insurance
securitization can be particularly appealing. It vastly expands the private capital
available to meet aggregate risks beyond the limits of re-insurers into the vastly greater
limits of the capital markets themselves.
For auditing, to the extent that it is true that audit firms, their SIP affiliates or
reinsurers lack sufficient capital resources to meet catastrophic risks, then it is appealing
to consider devices to transfer and distribute that risk to the broader base of the capital
markets. It adds an additional layer of insurance on top of primary insurance, selfinsurance and reinsurance and taps not just insurance markets but capital markets too.
This expands pooling and distribution of risk and increases diversification compared to
traditional insurance.140 Adding IBS to address catastrophic risks of audit failure also
should reduce the volatility in insurance markets that auditors have faced for decades and
that is an important basis for the insurance-based arguments in favor of establishing ex
ante damages caps on auditor liability for audit failure.
Risks of adverse selection essentially disappear because any given auditing cat
bond issue is based on the risks facing a single auditing firm (although comprised of
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many members in the network). Risks of moral hazard are addressed in several ways.
First, the IBS layer is designed for the catastrophic event not the quotidian case. External
insurance and SIPs cover the main risks. As in the preceding illustration, IBS for
auditing transactions set the effective coverage as a designated dollar amount (say $250
million) in excess of an underlying amount covered by other insurance (including selfinsurance), such as $500 million. Second, the indemnity or non-indemnity features
relating to the payout trigger and amounts can be tailored accordingly. Finally, there
should remain sufficient risk independence and risk-variability to enable the product to
function effectively as insurance.141 Of course, some moral hazard will remain even after
taking account of these tools.142
For insurers or auditors, funding IBS bond interest and distributing loss risk to
investors is functionally equivalent to the cost they would incur if they chose to distribute
the risk using traditional reinsurance policies. If IBS can attract investors at interest rates
in the range of, say, LIBOR+7% (as they have in the general catastrophe bond market),
then this will be attractive so long as actual or functional reinsurance costs are greater
than that.
The interest rate demanded on auditing cat bonds of the various firms reflects the
relative degree of risk each firm faces. This introduces the numerous advantages of
capital market discipline. First, since audit failure losses are paid, in part, by capital
market investors, capital market monitoring of auditing firm performance appears. This
amounts to a sort of re-bundling of the risk-monitoring and risk-distribution functions.
The capital markets as a whole effectively self-insure.
Second, investors will require auditing firms to furnish more information than
they presently do concerning loss exposure. Note, however, that the required information
is not the auditors’ assets or net worth or other information provided in financial
statements but rather the firms’ historical loss risk experience (such as lawsuits filed and
settled or regulatory investigations conducted and resolved). Auditors may be willing to
share some such information, despite their traditional unwillingness to disclose publicly
complete financial information. After all, these transactions would be private
placements, thus limiting public disclosure, and the required disclosure would relate to
risks of catastrophic loss without requiring complete financial statements that firms
consider to be proprietary.
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Third, this would redefine the relationship between auditing firms and capital
market investors. At present, capital market investors may too often treat auditing firms
as insurers of financial reporting, despite limited auditor ability to perform that function
and limited resources to support it. When investors buy auditing firm cat bonds, they
have an additional direct interest in reducing the frequency and magnitude of audit
failure. In addition to increased monitoring of audit firm performance, this could induce
monitoring and control over plaintiffs’ lawyers to deter pursuing excessive damages
claims against auditors, which is an important adjunct of the insurance-based arguments
favoring damages caps for auditors.
Securitizing audit failure risk could also contribute to curbing the problem of
pocket shifting prevalent in securities fraud class actions today. This occurs when an
issuer suffering market price drops due to financial misstatement pays one class of
shareholders at the expense of another class, depending on fortuities of the timing of
stock trades.143 With IBS for auditing, at least for federal securities class actions against
auditors for audit failure, the pocket shifting may persist but an additional cash flow
stream enters. In this cash flow-stream, funds flow out of one pocket and back into that
same pocket.144 True, significant transaction and agency costs remain, especially in
lawyers’ fees. But the current critique of pocket shifting worries about how the shift is
from one pocket of shareholders to a different pocket of shareholders. With IBS for
auditing, the pocket, through self-insurance, stays in substantially the same position (net
of transaction and agency costs).
Finally, an IBS transaction is relatively simple for an auditing firm to complete
compared to the political and structural challenges necessary either to establish caps on
damages or implement novel reforms such as adopting a regime of financial statement
insurance. True, some political resistance may appear, but it likely can be overcome. For
example, the Reinsurance Association of America views IBS as a direct competitor and
so has emphasized in lobbying efforts that the reinsurance industry has abundant capacity
and that IBS should be seen, at most, as a supplement not an alternative to reinsurance.145
On the other side, the Bond Market Association (BMA) is enthusiastic about IBS and
discounts concerns about why investors may not find them attractive and urges increasing
their appeal through more favorable US federal income tax treatment.146 Auditing firms
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who find IBS enticing will enjoy a similar reception: the MBA will welcome them but
the RAA (and the reinsurers of the firms’ SIP affiliates) may demur.147
CONCLUSION
Policy debate over capping auditor damages in securities litigation, dating to the
1970s, implicates the perennial issue concerning the relative expense or limited
availability to auditors of external insurance. As evidence, proponents cite the
contraction of E&O markets for auditing insurance and the rise of auditing firm selfinsurance programs. Analysis of this insurance-based argument suggests that it is
overstated in that self-insurance is better at promoting audit effectiveness—and financial
statement insurance would be better yet. The legitimate target in the debate is the threat
of catastrophic risks, the mega case that would destroy a firm and jeopardize the auditing
industry. That concern might be addressed by caps, but this has been a political and
policy thicket for nearly 40 years.
The concern and analysis entice asking: what else besides caps might be used?
After all, the problem is not sui generis and caps are not the only solution. Catastrophic
risks with limited or expensive insurance or reinsurance arise from natural phenomena
like hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and tornados. Some such events—like Hurricane
Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake—rivet insurers and yield very hard insurance
markets. In response to those two events, in particular, insurers and other businesses
turned to the capital markets and invented insurance-based securitization as an alternative
or supplement to reinsurance. This innovation can be adapted easily to the auditing
context. Firms likely would be better off—and their contributions to financial reporting
more effective—by pursuing catastrophe bond securitizations rather than continuing the
campaign to secure caps on damages that they face for audit failure.
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Purely as a matter of speculation, this could help to explain why, to the extent that the concept is
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